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Traditional digital forensics‘ procedures to recover and analyze digital data were focused 
on media-type storage devices like hard drives, hoping to acquire evidence or traces of 
malicious behavior in stored files. Usually, investigators would image the data and 
explore it in a somewhat ―safe‖ environment; this is meant to reduce as much as possible 
the amount of loss and corruption that might occur when analysis tools are used. 
Unfortunately, techniques developed by intruders to attack machines without leaving files 
on the disks and the ever dramatically increasing size of hard drives make the discovery 
of evidence difficult. These increased interest in research on live forensics (attempting to 
obtain evidence while the system is running) and on volatile memory forensic analysis. 
Because of the important role they play in computing systems, volatile memory is a 
source of information about running processes, network connections, opened files and/or 
loaded kernel modules that might be valuable to forensic investigations. 
In this thesis we show that when provided with an image of the physical memory of a 
Linux system, it is possible to extract data about a specific running process, enough to be 
able to resume its execution on a prepared environment. We also describe two proof-of-
concept tools gettsk and memexec developed for this purpose. This would allow 
investigators to not only obtain information about a suspicious running task from a RAM 






 Digital forensic investigations aim at establishing the patterns, causes and 
consequences of attacks on a computer system. Investigators attempt to determine the 
nature and chronology of events that might have caused system failure or loss of valuable 
assets. They seek evidence of changes in configurations and any artifact that could alter 
the behavior of the system or put it in an undesirable state. This is done mainly by 
capturing and analyzing storage devices for threats and exploited vulnerabilities. In some 
cases, malicious software (or malware) are responsible for the misbehavior, in which 
situation suspected software programs are identified and studied through a set of 
activities called malware analysis. These techniques help determine what damages the 
malware can expose the system to, thus allowing investigators to take appropriate 
decisions and measures to mitigate and ultimately annihilate its effects. Because of the 
danger they represent, it is commonly recommended to perform forensic analyses of 
malicious programs in a non-production and heavily controlled environment.  
 Historically, only permanent storage media such as hard disk drives were 
examined by investigators who hoped to find evidence in files on disk. Since they do not 
lose their contents when the machine is powered down, researchers have been able to 
develop methods to analyze files and their associated metadata for knowledge valuable to 
forensic investigations. However, they do not constitute the only sources of information; 
a considerable amount of data about computer systems can be obtained by exploring the 
contents of volatile media amid the primordial role they play in performing operating 




running on a host at a given time, as well as associated objects such as opened/mapped 
files and network connections, by examining the physical memory. However, the volatile 
nature of the memory and the fact that their use is highly operating system-dependent 
make the acquisition and analysis of its contents challenging. Even when the RAM is 
successfully acquired and enough process-specific data retrieved, it is still difficult to 
perform an effective malware analysis. 
 In this document, we describe ways to collect information about a running 
process, when provided with an image of a Linux 2.6 physical memory, and resume its 
execution on another host. This will permit investigators not only to examine the data for 
evidence, but also to perform further malware analysis in a controlled environment. 
 
1.1. Background, Overview and Problem Statement 
 
 Computer-related attacks against individuals and companies referred to as 
cybercrime, have been on the rise for the past decades. Various types of cybercrime exist 
depending on parameters such as the target and the techniques used to execute the attack; 
they are often classified as follows with respect to the crime perpetrated [16]: 
- Identity theft: Access to and misuse of personal information for fun or profit. 
- Cyber harassment: Use of computer systems to threaten or stalk another person. 
- Unauthorized access to computer systems or data: Also known as computer 
crime. 




- Non-access computer crimes: causing damage without gaining control of the 
computer system. This includes for example denial-of-service and virus attacks. 
The consequences of these attacks on personal and group welfare are considerable as 
shown by an Identity Theft Resource Centre (ITRC) report, which states that 662 major 
data breaches were identified in 2010, exposing more than 16 million personal records 
[29]. The U.S. department of Justice also reported from a survey that 67% of 
participating businesses have been victims of at least one cybercrime in 2005, with a total 
in losses estimated at $867 million [38]. In a similar survey, the Computer Security 
Institute (CSI) found out that the average loss per business in 2007 was around $350,000, 
nearly the double of the previous year results [39]. Cybercrime has escalated to introduce 
the concept of cyber warfare, which refers to actions that a country/nation or 
governmental organization takes to compromise the computing systems of other 
countries‘/nations‘ in order to disrupt, create damage or obtain secret information. A 
recent example of such actions is the Stuxnet worm that spread around the world and 
targeted specific industrial control systems [45]. Therefore, the need for digital forensic 
investigations and malware analysis techniques, to better understand these attacks and 
reduce the effects of cybercrime, is growing very fast and so is research in these areas.  
 Early digital forensics efforts were focused on permanent media storage, since the 
filesystem can be preserved and studied to detect anomalies [8]. Their contents are 
imaged or copied into other devices and generally attached to different machines for 
further investigation. Unfortunately, intruders have developed techniques to hide tracks 
of their mischief such as deleting compromising evidence, and performing their attacks 




programs running on the system, the network connections opened, the loaded kernel 
modules or other process and operating system-related artifacts at the time of acquisition, 
as they are generally stored on main memory. This increased the interest in live forensics 
(attempt to obtain evidence while the system is running) and in the analysis of volatile 
media such as the Random Access Memory or RAM. The storage acquisition and 
analysis methodologies as well as their limitations are developed in Section 2.1.2.  
 The main memory plays an important role to the effective functioning of a 
computing system, as it is used to keep track of the interactions between the OS, the 
applications running on the machine, the filesystem and the hardware (CPU). Therefore, 
harvesting the contents of the RAM is of undeniable value to a forensic investigation, 
especially if the acquisition is done correctly, at the right time and can be parsed for 
evidence. For instance, some passwords and encryption keys can be found in memory 
[25, 30], as well as structures holding important information about running processes 
[43]. Fortunately, in the past decade, major progress in documenting what kind of data 
can be extracted from an image of RAM and how to obtain it have been made (discussed 
in Section 2.3).  However the resulting tools and techniques are mostly operating system-
dependent, because of the differences in the way each uses the memory. Furthermore, 
investigators do not have a complete understanding of what incidents might have 
happened on the system just from a memory analysis, since the results are mainly 
presented in the form of lists (such as list of running processes, open files and network 
connections) and represent the state of the machine at a specific moment (they do not 




 In light of all the above, two questions concerning the forensic analysis of 
physical memory come to mind. First, when provided with the RAM dump of a machine, 
what kind of data can be extracted? Second, how can we make the obtained information 
more useful to investigations?  
Taking into consideration the fact that most of the incidents happening on computers are 
linked to applications, our approach is concentrated on acquiring knowledge about 
specific processes being run on the machine when the RAM was captured and restoring 
their execution state. Is all the data necessary to bring a process back to life available 
from the memory image? Assuming the answer is affirmative, how hard is it to resume a 
process? What kind of environment is required? These are some of the questions that will 
be considered in this thesis. 
 
1.2. Purpose and Motivation 
 
 The purpose of our work is to determine to what extent it is possible to collect 
data about a specific process running on the machine and resume its execution on another 
―safe‖ environment, from an image of the memory of a Linux 2.6 kernel.  
 The immediate benefit that such a capability offers is bringing together the 
advantages of both ―dead‖ and ―live‖ forensic analysis techniques (described in Section 
2.1.1). Indeed, obtaining an image of the RAM allows the investigation to be performed 
with minimum corruption of the state of the original machine; Meanwhile gathering the 
context and environment of a process and resuming its execution on a prepared host gives 




investigators to have a repeatable analysis process (which is of great value when evidence 
is presented in a court of law) and give them the ability to perform additional inquiries on 
extracted artifacts without risk to production systems.  
An important aspect of digital forensics and incident response is the study of malicious 
software or malware analysis in order to determine their purpose, stop their progression 
and/or protect against their propagation (See Section 2.2). One of the techniques used 
here is dynamic malware analysis, which involves running the malware to observe and 
monitor its interactions with the system rather than attempting to determine the malware 
execution path without actually running it. Our work could allow investigators to perform 
dynamic malware analysis on a suspicious program rebuilt from an image of the RAM. 
A more detailed description of the potential benefits of our work can be found in Section 
2.5. 
 
1.3. Document Structure 
  
 This document is divided in six parts. Following this introduction,  Chapter 2 
gives a general overview of the field of digital forensics and presents prior work related 
to the analysis of physical memory; the contributions that our study bring are also 
discussed. Chapter 3 documents what relevant information about a running process is 
available in a Linux RAM and where to locate it in the 2.6 kernel. Chapter 4 and Chapter 
5 describe in detail, the activities to perform in order to acquire and store process specific 
data, as well as ways to transport the execution of the process onto another host. They 




described methods. We conclude with a summary of the thesis, a statement of the major 
problems encountered during research as well as future work. 
 
2. DIGITAL FORENSICS BACKGROUND, RELATED WORK AND CONTRIBUTION 
 
 This chapter presents a general view of what digital forensics and malware 
analysis are about, followed by a review of major developments in the forensic analysis 
of physical memory. We close the chapter with an enumeration of the potential benefits 
that our research can bring to the forensics community. 
 
2.1. Overview of Digital Forensics Process and Practices 
 
 According to Wiles [51], digital forensics can be defined as ―the preservation, 
identification, extraction, interpretation and documentation of computer evidence‖. This 
definition suggests that to get the best results acceptable in a legal system, investigations 
require a variety of activities (preservation, extraction, interpretation and documentation). 
Over the years, researchers have proposed different processes and codes of conduct to 
perform these various tasks. The following sections describe general digital forensics 
investigation process models as well as the major activities they comprise. 
 
2.1.1. Digital Forensics Methodologies 
 A main concept in defining digital forensics models, consists in following existing 
procedures used for physical crime scenes, and includes technology-specific guidelines. 
Carrier and Spafford proposed a model of digital investigation, admissible in a court of 




benefit [11]. The result of such collaboration is a link between human suspects and digital 
evidence. Carrier summarizes the process into three general stages [7]:  
- Preservation: Collect and copy the digital data in its entirety and integrity. 
- Search and Analysis: includes examination, interpretation and recovery of the 
acquired data. 
- Reconstruction: report and documentation of events leading to the crime.  
In practice however, applying these recommendations is not a simple issue; factors 
surrounding the investigation such as the state of the machine at different stages of the 
process have to be taken into account. 
In the early years of digital forensics, “dead” acquisition was used. This method requires 
investigators to power down the machine(s) to be examined to avoid potential loss or 
modification of data on the system. Afterwards, media such as hard drives and other data-
persistent devices are harvested for analysis (see Fig. 1).  
 







Figure 2. ―Live‖ Forensic Acquisition [31] 
 
More recently, new techniques emerged to acquire and analyze data while the system is 
still running. They form what is called ―live‖ forensic analysis (see Fig. 2). It is worth 
noting that both Figure 1 and Figure 2 do not address acquiring volatile data, illustrating 
the fact that it was not appropriately considered in early forensic investigations. 
Lessing and Von Solms published a comparative study of both frameworks (―dead‖ and 
―live‖ forensic analysis) [31]. According to their observations, ―dead‖ analysis 
procedures are straightforward and more or less platform independent. Also, chances that 
evidence are corrupted are very small since the computer is not running. However, dead 
forensic analysis presents some limitations, which include:  
- Volatile data (data that exist when the machine is running and is destroyed 
after a shutdown) such as network information and physical memory are 




- With the increasing size of hard drives, investigations become time-
consuming and valuable evidence could be missed as a consequence of the 
large amount of information. 
- It is now common practice to use encryption on disks for protection against 
attackers who have physical access to the system. When the machine is 
powered off, the encryption keys (usually residing in memory) necessary to 
access the contents of the storage device are not available [25, 26]. In such 
situations, the investigator may not be able to analyze the collected data. 
Live forensic analysis on the other hand allows analysis of volatile data through 
techniques such as ―trusted‖ command shells (local analysis) or remote connections 
(network analysis). The investigators interact directly with the underlying operating 
system and therefore have access to the memory; with the appropriate credentials, disk 
encryption is not an issue anymore [26]. Live analysis however can be associated with 
shortcomings that can diminish the value of forensic evidence in court [31, 9, 26]: 
- Evidence can be altered. Because of the interaction with the operating system, 
tools or mistakes from the investigator might modify files and/or memory 
locations on the system and potentially affect evidence. 
- The tests performed during live forensics are generally not repeatable, since 
the state of the system changes. 
- The tools are platform dependent. Every system is different, so the tools must 





- The presence of a kernel rootkit (malicious software running on a system, at 
the kernel level and with privileged permissions while at the same time hiding 
its existence to users by changing the normal behavior of the operating 
system) could provide investigators with erroneous, incomplete or no 
information at all. 
An alternative to both ―dead‖ and live analysis would be to complementarily combine 
them during a unique investigation process. Mrdovic et al. [35] claim that such a 
combination is feasible with the use of memory imaging/dumping and virtualization. 
Indeed, both persistent and volatile data could be imaged/copied and then the studied 
machine powered down. Finally, a virtual environment could be created to mimic the 
behavior of the investigated computer. At this point, some ―live‖ interaction could 
happen without significant impact on the integrity of the collected evidence. Although 
most of the shortcomings of dead analysis do not apply when this technique is used and 
the process is repeatable, the live interaction in the virtual machine is still operating-
system based and thus subject to evidence manipulation. 
 
2.1.2. Digital Forensics Activities 
2.1.2.1. Acquisition and Preservation 
 It is crucial for investigators to correctly collect and preserve data from machines; 
any mistake could lead to loss of evidence or rejection from court. Carrier indicates that a 
great deal of information pertaining to a digital forensic investigation can be obtained 
from files in external storage media like hard drives [8]. He also describes general 




systems, which performs a byte-to-byte copy from one medium to the other, and the 
concept of hashing to verify the integrity of copied data.  
Unfortunately, in addition to the disk encryption discussed earlier, hard drives wear out 
over time or can be damaged; also, attackers have developed ways to hide their tracks 
through data destruction (deleting files potentially containing evidence of intrusion) [23] 
and data contraception (performing attacks without writing to any file on disk, also 
referred to as memory resident malware) [24]. Therefore, the interest in obtaining other 
sources of data such as volatile storage media grew significantly.  
 Because of the transient nature of volatile data, its acquisition is challenging and 
time sensitive. Methods and tools exist to efficiently dump the RAM, classified by 
Burdach in two major groups [6]: Software and hardware-based methods. 
- Software-based memory acquisition consists of utilities loaded on the live 
system to dump the RAM on an external device. Generally, the effects of 
running the toolkit on the system are known to the investigator and are 
considered during analysis. However, if the machine is infected, there is a 
chance that the tool used to image the memory gets compromised by the 
malicious program and that misleading evidence is produced. Moreover, it is 
difficult to verify that the imaging operation was performed correctly, since 
the memory is constantly changing. These integrity and verifiability issues are 
not a concern in a virtual environment as most of the virtualization toolkits 
(such as VMware and Xen) provide mechanisms to acquire a snapshot of the 




contents of memory are constantly changing and thus data collected by the 
software tool might be inconsistent. 
- Hardware-based methods implant devices on the computer to bypass the 
Operating System. They use DMA (Direct Memory Access) to access the 
RAM and copy its contents to external storage media. Unfortunately, attackers 
might be able to detect the devices and as a result, provide erroneous 
information. An example of such hardware components includes a hidden PCI 
card that would be visible to the machine only when enabled by an 
investigator; however, this method is impractical as it requires the PCI card to 
be installed and configured on the machine before the incident occurs [10]. 
Also, a firewire device (IEEE 1394) that accesses the physical memory 
independently of the CPU can be used [34]. This firewire acquisition 
technique can slightly modify the state of the machine (in case the operating 
system has to activate the port) and, if not properly performed, crash the 
system. 
Contrary to popular belief, some of the RAM hardware on the market does not 
immediately lose their contents when the system is powered down; there is a small time 
window of data persistence (several seconds), which could be significantly extended by 
freezing the RAM chips [25].  This retention capability could be exploited by 
investigators to copy the contents of the memory by rapidly restarting the machine after a 
shutdown; the full operating system is not loaded, rather, a specially crafted program 




machine and dump the contents of the RAM [25]. This method however presents a timing 
challenge, and can be tried only once: in case of failure, everything will be lost. 
2.1.2.2. Data Analysis 
 Much information can be obtained by examining the data acquired from a hard 
drive for a forensic investigation: deleted files can be restored; log files, browsing history 
and more can help support or refute theories about the incidents [8]. The investigators 
typically have to rebuild the volumes and partitions from the image, based on the specific 
type of file systems in use, and then search through the files for tangible evidence. The 
rapid increase in hard-drive size, the proliferation of file types/formats and the rise of 
storage management technologies such as RAID and LVM have complicated the 
investigators‘ ability to discover evidence. In such situations, information gathered by 
analyzing the physical memory can be particularly useful since they might provide 
preliminary answers and help the investigator prioritize on the type of information to look 
for in the filesystem. Also, as researchers are developing more ways to extract, parse and 
study the contents of memory, some investigators have started to give a lot more value to 
the data from the RAM. 
 Despite the importance of the information that could be found in the RAM, 
research in forensic analysis of memory is relatively young (no more than a decade old). 
Initially, investigators derived clues by searching for strings on the binary dump of the 
memory, hoping to uncover sequences of characters that might have a meaning such as 
the name of a process or a loaded kernel module. Unfortunately, this method is not 
efficient because of the important number of strings that can be found in a memory dump. 
It was not until the release of the 2005 Memory Analysis Challenge for the 5
th




the Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) [2, 17], that an active community 
began making progress on answering the question of what can be discovered given a 
snapshot of memory (more details in Section 2.3).  
 
2.2. Overview of Malware Analysis 
  
 In the aftermath of a computer attack, or after a security incident has been 
detected, a set of activities, referred to as incident response, is generally performed to 
identify the threats on the system, reduce potential damages and ultimately prevent the 
attack to happen again in the future. The SANS (SysAdmin, Audit, Networking and 
Security) Institute proposed a standard approach to incident response composed of six 
consecutive steps [15]: Preparation, Identification, Containment, Eradication, Recovery 
and Lessons Learned. 
Malware Analysis, the study of an unwanted and potentially malicious piece of software 
(such as virus, Trojan, spyware, etc…), is an inherent part of the incident response 
process and is usually associated with the identification phase. Indeed, malware analysis 
activities attempt to determine exactly what actions the malware performs and to some 
extent, how it was introduced into the system. This permits the responders to efficiently 
recover from incidents and strengthen their system against similar infections. 
The traditional methodology in performing malware analysis involves collecting all the 
available artifacts (such as code and/or executable files) of the malicious software and 
transporting them into a contained (i.e. cannot infect production machines) host 




actually run or not, there exist two different types of malware analysis techniques: static 
and dynamic analysis [15, 1].  
 
2.2.1. Static Malware Analysis 
 
 Static analysis refers to the set of techniques used to determine how a piece of 
malware works without executing it on a machine. This usually involves reverse 
engineering the software and/or examining its code/binaries to understand what it is 
supposed to do. The most common tools range from the advanced decompilers and 
disassemblers to the simple source code viewers and string matching utilities [40]. Static 
analysis permits investigators to walk through the malicious code and immediately 
identify the weaknesses exploited by the malware and therefore plan for effective defense 
mechanisms to be implemented on the system. Also, most or all of the execution paths of 
the malicious software can be covered through this analysis method and it is usually 
faster than dynamic analysis [15, 1, 17]. However, static analysis has a few limitations: 
- For large and complex code, it may be difficult to completely predict what 
the malware does; Investigators sometimes have to approximate the 
overall behavior. 
- Obfuscation techniques have been developed to make the disassembly and 
reverse engineering process more difficult. Obfuscation is concerned with 
modifying the structure and syntax of a program so that it would be hard 




functionality and efficiency. These techniques make static analysis harder, 
not impossible. 
- Sometimes the code examined during static analysis is not necessarily the 
code executed on the machine; metamorphic code (code that reprogram 
itself) and polymorphic code (different code at each execution, though 
having the same functionality) are examples of such programs and thus 
static analysis may not be accurate in these cases. 
- It is also possible that the malware will respond differently depending on 
an input provided. In some cases for example, that input represent 
additional code that the attacker sends over the network and thus is not 
necessarily available to the investigator. 
 
2.2.2. Dynamic Malware Analysis 
 
 Dynamic malware analysis techniques, contrary to static analysis, attempt to 
determine the interactions between the malware and the system, by actually running the 
program and analyzing its behavior. Safety restrictions are more important in these 
situations, since running the unknown piece of software could be disastrous for the host: 
The malware could destroy key functionalities, break loose and potentially harm other 
machines and networks. It is therefore imperative for the investigator to prepare a 
contained and asset-free environment in which to launch the execution of the malware for 




library calls made by the program or examining each machine instruction with the help of 
debuggers or machine emulators [1, 17]. 
The major benefit of dynamic analysis over static analysis is the assurance that the 
machine instructions being analyzed are the ones that the program actually executes; i.e. 
it is not affected by techniques like obfuscation and polymorphic code. On the other 
hand, dynamic analysis has some drawbacks: 
- For complex and large programs, it is difficult to run through all their 
execution paths and thus predictions on their behavior in a random setup are 
difficult to make. 
- In dynamic analysis, there is a limited view of the internals of the program. 
Unless using a virtual machine (VM) coupled with introspection techniques 
(monitoring and inspecting guest operating systems in a virtual environment 
from the outside to observe behavior [36]), one can only observe input/output 
and library/system calls.  
- The analysis environment is not invisible to the malware. As mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, the safety measures taken in building the analysis 
environment are of crucial importance. Malicious software can be tailored to 
behave differently depending on the underlying configurations of the system. 
For example, to ensure absolute containment, investigators can build a VM 
similar the one infected, without network connections; however, it is possible 
to determine that the program is running on a VM by checking the hardware 
configurations that virtualization software usually utilize, through techniques 




could then program the software not to execute properly when such properties 
are detected. 
 
2.3. Advances in Forensic Analysis of Physical Memory 
 
 Numerous utilities have been developed to help investigators perform memory 
analysis. Most of these tools are however platform dependent, due to the unique way each 
operating system (and even specific versions) handles the RAM. We now present some of 
these tools and related developments, organized with respect to the underlying family of 
operating systems. 
 
2.3.1. RAM Analysis on Microsoft Windows 
 
 The DFRWS challenge, mentioned in Section 2.1.2.2 above, provided contestants 
with a memory dump from a Windows 2000 machine to be analyzed. From this emanated 
two research results: 
First, Betz studied the way the Windows 2000 kernel uses the memory, and designed a 
command line tool called Memparser that produces a list of running processes on the 
system, even the ones that were hidden to the operating system [2]. 
Garner and Mora developed KnTList (part of the now commercial toolset KnTTools), 
which could list the running and hidden processes on the machine, as well as access some 
other system‘s information such as time parameters and ARP cache [19]. 
In 2005, Burdach published a guide to discovering Windows 2000 and Windows XP 




Forensics Toolkit), which can enumerate active processes and loaded modules as well as 
other kernel structures such as driver objects when provided with their addresses in 
memory.  
A year later, Schuster created the tool PTfinder which is capable of discovering, from an 
image of the RAM, all processes and threads running on Windows NT systems (including 
ones that were potentially deleted by kernel attacks or persisted through a reboot). This 
utility also provided users with a graphical and hierarchical view of the processes 
discovered, so investigators could easily determine parental relationships between the 
threads [42]. 
In 2007, Walters and Petroni introduced a set of tools to analyze memory dumps from 
Windows XP SP2 systems: volatools. The suite evolved to become The Volatility 
Framework, one of the most used open source toolkits for Windows memory forensic 
analysis. It provides important functionalities, such as [50]: 
- Information on running processes and threads (list of open files, addressable 
memory, loaded DLLs) 
- Information on network connections 
- Support for different types of memory dumps (Windows crash dumps, 
hibernation) 
- Information about the registry and loaded kernel modules 
Moreover the framework can be extended through plug-ins and a beta version to support 
Linux operating systems is currently in development [14]. 
Another well-known tool is Memoryze, developed by the company MANDIANT in 2008, 




Memoryze can allow its users to acquire an image of the RAM as well as perform the 
analysis on both on live systems and RAM images. It provides the following, among 
other features [33]: 
- List the virtual address space of a given process including:  
- List all network sockets that the process has open, including any hidden by 
rootkits. 
- Specify the functions imported and exported by the EXE and DLLs. 
- Verify the digital signatures of the EXE and DLLs. (This is disk based.) 
- Output all strings in memory on a per process basis. 
 
2.3.2. RAM Analysis on OSX 
  
 Research on memory analysis on OSX systems is still rudimentary: we were not 
able to find any tool to perform analysis on OSX RAM. However, Suiche published a 
paper describing the kernel internals of this operating system [43]. He laid out details on 
memory management of processes, files and other kernel structures, necessary to retrieve 
valuable information from MAC OSX memory dumps. Because OSX is a Unix-like 
system and is largely based on BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution), it has similarities 
with Linux kernel structures, such as the existence of a doubly-linked list object to keep 





2.3.3. RAM Analysis on Linux 
 Various utilities for the forensic analysis of Linux RAM have been developed. 
One of the earliest is Burdach‘s iDetect, a tool that can provide information about user-
mode processes running on the system, as well as files mapped into memory. It was 
designed for Linux 2.4-x and uses the System.map file (symbol table used by the kernel) 
to obtain the address of important kernel structures. 
Urrea developed a proof-of-concept for what he called ―the basis of later research in 
RAM forensics‖ [46]. He focused his efforts on kernel 2.6 and described means to obtain 
information on running processes and recover files loaded in physical memory. He also 
discussed ways to explore potential swap space, to complete the memory analysis. 
In 2008, Case et al. proposed a framework, called FACE, for digital forensic investigation 
that finds and correlates evidence from multiple sources (e.g. disk images, memory 
images and network capture) and multiple targets [12]. Their framework included 
Ramparser, a tool that analyzes Linux 2.6-x memory dumps and provides information on 
running processes, network connections and loaded kernel modules. In an attempt to 
reduce the platform dependency of Linux memory analysis tools, Ramparser was later 
improved to support a variety of kernel versions [21]. This was achieved by dynamically 
reverse engineering core kernel functions for each version, to obtain data structures‘ 
offsets necessary for a deep memory analysis and save them in an extensible database. 
SecondLook, a commercial tool from Pikewerks Corporation was recently introduced 
[37]. It provides users with a GUI interface for ease of use as well as a command line 
interface for custom analysis. Running processes, network connections and loaded kernel 




Kollar developed a tool called Foriana that, when provided with a memory dump, 
attempts to determine the corresponding operating system by using pattern matching and 
performing a string search on the image (hoping to identify the name of a known standard 
process such as ―init‖ for example for Linux systems) [30]. The tool uses heuristics to 
find kernel structures in memory, and then generates a list of loaded modules and running 
processes. 
A more recent project started by Girault resulted in volatilitux [20]. volatilitux can extract 
memory-mapped files from the RAM, output the list of running processes as well as 
produce process-specific information such as the list of open files and memory mappings. 
 
2.4. Work Related to Process Resumption 
 
 Resuming the execution of a process loaded in memory is closely related to the 
way it has been extracted. Most of the efforts realized in this prospect, were directed 
towards dumping the binaries of the process. The procmemdump and procexedump plug-
ins of the Volatility tool are prime examples [50]: they permit investigators the obtain 
executables from the memory of Windows systems. We could not find any similar work 
for the analysis of an image of the Linux RAM. However, for live Linux systems, Ilo 
presented a proof-of-concept tool to extract the binaries of a running process [28]. 
Although his primary goal consisted in building a single binary file from the artifacts 
collected from the memory about a running process, he also proposed a sequence of steps 
that one could take in order to recover the state of the process on another host or at 




- Get the files used by the process, place them in the appropriate location and 
open them. 
- Create a new process  
- Copy process segments and registers in the appropriate locations 
- Launch the execution of the process 
An area of research related to our project is process migration or process 
checkpoint/restart techniques on Linux systems, which is concerned with saving the state 
of a running process from a live machine in order to resume its execution on another host 
or for rollback purposes. Linking checkpointing and digital forensics is not a completely 
new initiative, it was proposed by Foster and Wilson in their introduction to process 
forensics [18]. They argue that checkpointing can be a powerful tool in the arms of the 
digital forensic investigator or to the incidence response team, since crucial evidence can 
be obtained from processes running on a host. 
One approach to checkpointing consists in loading a kernel module into the system and 
using it to save the state of a chosen process onto a file and restart its execution through 
the same module. CRAK is an example of a tool that uses the Linux Kernel Module 
(LKM) option to restart a previously saved Linux process or group of processes [52].  
Currently, we did not find any work that extracts a running process from an image of 
memory and resume its execution. 
 






 Many advantages can be associated with the recovery of the context of a running 
process from a memory image as well the resumption of its execution in another 
environment. We now present and discuss a non-exhaustive list of them in detail.  
 
Benefits to General Forensic Investigations: 
- We cannot stress enough the importance to a case, of the information that is 
available when analyzing non-volatile storage. It is possible, for example to 
determine what kind of machine it was in the first place (version of operating 
system and underlying hardware characteristics in case this was not known), what 
modules were loaded on the system and even find some password and encryption 
keys that could help break a case. With the list of running processes that our work 
provides, investigators might be able to identify unknown, unexpected and/or 
potentially dangerous programs that were on the machine at the time of 
acquisition of the RAM image. They could then take a closer look at the type of 
resources that the process was accessing such as the user running the process, the 
opened file descriptors (includes files, network connections and ports) and the 
memory mappings. 
- The fact that we are provided with an image of the memory would normally imply 
the use of ―dead‖ analysis techniques, meaning that there would be no live 
interaction and the observation of the evolution of the system over time is not an 
option. As indicated in Section 2.1.1, it is possible to combine both ―live‖ and 
―dead‖ analysis on one case, with the use of memory dumping and virtualization. 




gives ―life‖ to the data obtained from the RAM and thus allows for ―live‖ analysis 
to occur without significant changes to the integrity of the collected evidence. 
Moreover, the problems of live techniques are minimized as the process is 
repeatable and the impact of tools is limited. 
 
Benefits to Malware Analysis: 
After an investigator has detected a potentially harmful process running on a 
machine, the next step is usually to perform malware analysis.  
- The CPU state (register set), at the moment of acquisition of the memory, of the 
process of interest is available and can be taken into account when reverse 
engineering is performed. Moreover, the code section of the memory mappings 
associated with the application can be dumped into binaries that can use for static 
malware analysis. 
- When provided with an image of RAM, being able to resume the execution of a 
process so that dynamic analysis can be performed is already an important 
contribution. More so, if the resumption phase can be done in a safe environment 
built for the purpose of observation, as production systems will be compromised. 
Our approach suggests building a virtual machine, similar to the original system 
(which is actually a common malware analysis technique), in which the execution 
of the program will continue. Most virtualization software provide additional 





- A legitimate question to ask is why not dump the binaries of the process from the 
memory and launch its execution from the beginning? This method has been used 
before (see Section 2.4) and would certainly allow for malware analysis to take 
place. The problem with this approach is that most attackers are aware of the 
latest forensic techniques such as studying the binary in a virtual environment. To 
work around such techniques, they tend to perform VM detection and/or check for 
other configurations and change the behavior of the program accordingly. These 
checks generally occur when the program starts its execution. Thus, if the process 
is resumed from where it stopped when the memory image was collected, there is 
a decent chance that this detection phase is over. 
 
3. THE LINUX KERNEL AND PROCESS INFORMATION IN MEMORY 
 
 Before we describe how to obtain relevant information about a running process 
from a RAM dump and resuming its execution, it is primordial to understand how the 
Linux kernel manages the memory, especially process-specific data. Indeed, to maintain 
control over the execution flow on the machine, the kernel must keep track of process 
activity by storing various attributes such as the process‘ state, children and CPU 
registers. A look into the C source code of the kernel reveals that this information is 
organized in memory through a number of data structures—There are many ways to 
access the source code of the Linux kernel such as looking at location /usr/src/linux-
headers-x/ (‗x‘ represents the kernel version) on the local machine (if the source files 
are installed) or browsing online repositories [32]—The following subsections will 
describe some of these data structures and their relationships, for the kernel version 
2.6.35 on x86 systems, as well as present the memory management mechanisms used in 
Linux.  
3.1. Linux Memory Management 
 
3.1.1. The Virtual Memory 
 
 To ensure that CPU multithreading and time-sharing (i.e. the possibility to have 
more than one process use the same system resources over a certain period of time) are 
efficient, it is crucial to share the physical memory between processes. Because of the 




and the amount of space needed by the all the programs running on the system, the Linux 
operating system implements virtual memory, which is a layer of abstraction of the RAM 
to processes and users.   
On a 32-bit x86 system for example, the whole 2
32 
= 4 GB addressable space, ranging 
from 0x00000000 to 0xFFFFFFFF, is considered available to each user process and each 
address is referred to as linear address or virtual address. The kernel, also uses a virtual 
address space but splits it into two parts at the PAGE_OFFSET (macro defined as 
0xC0000000) mark: The first part (of size 3GB) is mapped to the currently running 
process and changes at every context switch, while the second part is fixed and used for 
other kernel operations [22]. As a result of this split, every user process reserves 1GB in 
its linear address space mapped to the kernel‘s first virtual memory zone and used when 
the process in running in kernel mode (See Fig. 3). The rest of the process‘ virtual space 
is directly addressable and is divided into pages of size PAGE_SIZE (can be 4KB, 2MB or 
4MB on x86. In practice, it is typically 4KB). 
 





3.1.2. From Virtual to Physical Memory:  Translation and Paging 
 
 The actual physical memory does not follow the same scheme as its virtual 
counterpart. Rather, physical addresses are used to map the memory cells in memory 
chips and operating systems use a number of mechanisms to translate between the 
physical and linear addresses.  
Similar to the virtual address space of a user process, the RAM is divided into sets of 
contiguous addresses called page frames. These frames are grouped into zones with 
specific functions. In Linux for instance, there are three physical memory zones [22]: 
- ZONE_DMA: From 0 to 16 MB, used for Direct Access Memory (DMA) page 
frames. 
- ZONE_NORMAL: Ranges from 16MB to 896MB, contains non-DMA pages with 
virtual memory mapping. 
- ZONE_HIGHMEM (if applicable): 896MB and onwards and is not directly 
mapped to the kernel. 
At boot time, Linux directly maps physical address 0 with the kernel virtual address 
PAGE_OFFSET (0xC0000000). Therefore, when faced with a kernel virtual address, its 
physical equivalent is obtained simply by subtracting PAGE_OFFSET. For example, linear 
kernel address 0xc0342FF4 corresponds to actual physical memory location 0x00342FF4. 
The conversion process is completely different for user mode virtual addresses. In this 
case, the Linux operating system uses virtual memory paging to map the virtual pages to 
physical page frames in memory. The paging mechanism consists in dividing the linear 




2.6.35, the kernel implements four levels (splitting up the linear address in up to five 
parts) of page tables: 
- Page Global Directory (PGD) 
- Page Upper Directory (PUD) 
- Page Middle Directory (PMD) 
- Page Table (PTE) 
These levels are linked to each other (in the order cited) and each table contains addresses 
to a set of tables on the next level (see Fig. 4). This scheme was built to fit the 32-bit and 
64-bit architectures, as well as the Physical Address Extension or PAE (support for some 
Intel processors with 36 address pins, i.e. can address up to 64 GB of memory with three 
page levels) and extended paging (translation for systems with 4MB page sizes with just 
one page level) [3].  
 
 






For Intel x86 32-bit systems, the virtual address is divided in two parts which serve as 
offsets in the only two levels of page tables implemented (here, PUD and PMD do not 
exist).  
3.2. Process-Related Kernel Data Structures 
 
3.2.1. The Process Descriptor 
 
 Probably the most important process bookkeeping kernel artifact, the process 
descriptor is the entry point in memory to all the available information about a specific 
process or task (as commonly referred to in the kernel jargon). It is represented by the 
task_struct (cf. Fig. 5) data structure defined in include/linux/sched.h (from the 
top level directory of the kernel source code), whose fields are used to identify, store and 
track the various aspects of a task including but not limited to [3, 40]: 
- Process State: Through the state field in the task_struct, the execution 
status (running, stopped, interruptible or not, etc…) of the task is saved. 
- Process Id and Name: Mostly used for identification, the id and name of the 
process are respectively kept in the pid and comm attributes in the 
task_struct. 
- Credentials: These represent the permissions that are associated with the 
process and are used to determine what operations the task is (or is not) 
allowed to perform. It is represented in the process descriptor by an attribute 




structure contains information such as the user (uid) and group (gid) ids 
associated with process. 
- Scheduling Properties: For a more efficient use of the CPU execution cycles 
and control over the process switching and scheduling activities, the kernel 
stores via the process descriptor a number of values such as the process 
priority and scheduling queue.  
- Process Address Space: User space tasks require memory areas to store 
segments (code, data, stack, etc…) or to map files. The set of virtual 
addresses reserved for a process form its address space. The kernel keeps 
track of these memory locations through the mm field of type mm_struct 
(more details in Section 3.2.2). 
- Process Relationships: The process descriptor provides a link to the parent, 
children and siblings processes (using respectively the parent, children and 
sibling fields) of a task. 
- Filesystem Properties: With the files and fs variables in task_struct, the 
kernel can keep track of the files opened by a process as well as the current 
working directory (more details in 3.2.3). 
- Process CPU-related information:  The process descriptor, through a variable 
of type thread_struct, also gives access to information about relations 
between the process and the CPU, such as the address of the Kernel Mode 
Stack of the process (location where the CPU registers of the process are 


























Figure 5. Excerpt of task_struct 
 
The kernel also keeps track of all the processes currently running on the machine by 
maintaining a circular doubly linked list of process descriptors, through the tasks field 
include/linux/sched.h 
1168 struct task_struct { 
1169        volatile long state;    /* -1 unrunnable, 0 runnable, >0 stopped*/ 
... 
1170        void *stack; 
1171        atomic_t usage; 
1172        unsigned int flags;     /* per process flags, defined below */ 
...  
1182 
1183        int prio, static_prio, normal_prio; 
1184        unsigned int rt_priority; 
1185        const struct sched_class *sched_class; 
1186        struct sched_entity se; 
1187        struct sched_rt_entity rt; 
1188 
... 
1221        struct list_head tasks; 
... 
1224        struct mm_struct *mm, *active_mm; 
... 
1243        pid_t pid; 
1244        pid_t tgid; 
...         struct task_struct *real_parent; /* real parent process */ 
1257        struct task_struct *parent;  
...       
1261        struct list_head children;      /* list of my children */ 
1262        struct list_head sibling;  
... 
1298        const struct cred *cred;         
... 
1305        char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; /* executable name excluding path*/ 
... 
1319/* CPU-specific state of this task */ 
1320        struct thread_struct thread; 
1321/* filesystem information */ 
1322        struct fs_struct *fs; 
1323/* open file information */ 
1324        struct files_struct *files; 
1325/* namespaces */ 
1326        struct nsproxy *nsproxy; 
1327/* signal handlers */ 
1328        struct signal_struct *signal; 
1329        struct sighand_struct *sighand; 
1330  
1331        sigset_t blocked, real_blocked; 
1332        sigset_t saved_sigmask; 







(of type list_head, the kernel‘s implementation of a circular doubly linked list) in each 
task_struct. Therefore, it is possible to obtain a list of all running tasks by traversing 
the linked list (See Appendix B), potentially starting from the kernel address of the 
init_task process (named swapper and first item in the doubly linked list). This address 
can be obtained in various ways such as looking into the kernel symbol table file 
/boot/System.map-x (‗x‘ represents the kernel version) [46] and through heuristics-
based search performed on the memory image [20]. 
3.2.2. Process Address Space 
  
 The Linux kernel uses a set of related data structures to manage the virtual 
memory space needed by a process. As stated in the previous subsection, each process 
descriptor has a field of type mm_struct dedicated to that purpose. The mm_struct data 
structure sometimes referred to as the memory descriptor, is defined in 
include/linux/mm_types.h and retains among others, the following information (See 
Fig. 6): 
- Page Global Directory: The pgd field in mm_struct stores this value, which 
represents the entry for this process‘ memory areas in the Page Global 
Directory (see Section 3.1.2). 
- Memory Segments: The kernel also uses the mm_struct to monitor process‘ 
segments in memory. Thus the start_code and end_code attributes refer to 
the limits of the text/code segment of a task, start_brk and brk to the 
growing heap, start_data and end_data to the data section containing 




arg_end and arg_start to the command line arguments, env_start and 
env_end to the environment variables.  
- Memory Regions: These are non-overlapping sets of adjacent virtual 
addresses that map into the various memory segments of a process. The mmap 
field (of type vm_area_struct) of mm_struct points to the first of these 
regions. A memory segment is actually a group of memory regions serving 











Figure 6. Excerpt of mm_struct 
 
For every task, the kernel maintains a linked-list of its associated memory regions. 
Therefore, each vm_area_struct (defined in include/linux/mm_types.h) includes a 
vm_next field pointing to the next region on the list, as well as a link (through the vm_mm 
attribute) back to the memory descriptor describing the address space they belong to. The 
structure also has self-describing elements such as vm_start, vm_end and 
vm_page_prot, respectively representing the beginning address, end address and access 
 222 struct mm_struct { 
 223        struct vm_area_struct * mmap;           /* list of VMAs */ 
 224        struct rb_root mm_rb; 
 ... 
 236        pgd_t * pgd; 
 237        atomic_t mm_users;          /* How many users with user space? */ 
 238        atomic_t mm_count;   /* How many references to "struct mm_struct" 
       (users count as 1) */ 
 239        int map_count;                          /* number of VMAs */ 
 ... 
 254        unsigned long start_code, end_code, start_data, end_data; 
 255        unsigned long start_brk, brk, start_stack; 
 256        unsigned long arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end; 
 257 
 ... 






permissions of the region. In case the vm_area_struct describes a non-anonymous 
memory-mapped disk file or shared library, the vm_file field is non-null and points to a 
file structure (see Section 3.2.3), while vm_pgoff represents the offset of the region in 
the mapped file in question. Fig. 7 gives a sample overview of the kernel structures 











3.2.3. Processes and Filesystem Kernel Structures 
 
 Processes in Linux constantly interact with files on disks; they are either mapped 
in memory for easier access or opened for basic input/output operations. However, 
regular named disk files are not the only type of files in the Linux system: directories, 
symbolic links, device files, sockets and pipes are all considered files [3, 40]. The Linux 
kernel uses a number of structures to store and maintain data on the relationships between 
process and files: 
 
- fs_struct: Defined in include/linux/fs_struct.h, it is accessed from 
the process descriptor of a task through the fs field and keeps information on 
the current working directory (pwd attribute), the root directory (root 
attribute) and their associated mounted filesystem. The same fs_struct can 
be shared between different processes that are executing from the same 
location; the field count is used to store the number of process descriptors 
linked to this structure. 
- files_struct: also accessible from a process‘ task_struct through the 
files attribute, it is defined in include/linux/fdtable.h and is 
sometimes referred to as the open file table structure to describe the type of 
information it holds. The fdt field of files_struct is of type fdtable 
(also called file descriptor table) that keeps, among other data, the maximum 




of file descriptors currently opened by the task. In Linux, the first three 
entries are stdin, stdout and stderr. 
- file (see Fig. 8): defined in include/linux/fs.h and referred to as file 
descriptor, it is the main structure used by the kernel to get information about 
the relationship between a process and the file, such as the process access 
mode (attribute f_mode), the current offset (f_pos) and a pointer to the file 
operations table (f_op; the table stores pointers to functions that are 
associated with the file). The structure also holds general file data including 
the user credentials (f_cred) as well as the directory entry (from which the 
pathname of the file can be constructed), and its associated mounted 





















Figure 8. Excerpt from file 
 
 917 struct file { 
 918        /* 
 919         * fu_list becomes invalid after file_free is called and queued via 
 920         * fu_rcuhead for RCU freeing 
 921         */ 
 922        union { 
 923                struct list_head        fu_list; 
 924                struct rcu_head         fu_rcuhead; 
 925        } f_u; 
 926        struct path             f_path; 
 927 #define f_dentry        f_path.dentry 
 928 #define f_vfsmnt        f_path.mnt 
 929        const struct file_operations    *f_op; 
 930        spinlock_t              f_lock;  /* f_ep_links, f_flags, no IRQ */ 
 931        atomic_long_t           f_count; 
 932        unsigned int            f_flags; 
 933        fmode_t                 f_mode; 
 934        loff_t                  f_pos; 
 935        struct fown_struct      f_owner; 
 936        const struct cred       *f_cred; 
 ... 
 950        struct address_space    *f_mapping; 
 ... 





Although the concepts and design remain the same for subversions of Linux 2.6, 
there might exist some slight differences in the code of the described structures. The 
disparities become greater when compared with older versions such as Linux 2.4. For 
example, rather than having an entire structure to handle process credentials (i.e. the field 
struct cred in the process descriptor), Linux 2.4 and even early Linux 2.6 versions just 
had extra fields added to the task_struct (uid, gid, suid, etc…). This is one of 
reasons why most the tools developed to analyze the RAM are operating system-
dependent.  To this effect, our experiment was entirely performed on machines running 
the same Linux distribution, on top of the same kernel version 2.6.35, even though it 




4. EXTRACTING PROCESS INFORMATION FROM THE RAM (GETTSK) 
 
 Chapter 3 gives an overview of how the Linux operating system manages the 
memory and keeps track of the tasks running on the machine. Now, we discuss the 
mechanisms necessary to retrieve process-related information, when provided with an 
image of the RAM of a Linux system. We start by describing the environment setup to 
carry out our experiment; then we document what specific data is extracted as well as 
how do to it. We conclude the chapter by presenting the results and discussing the 
limitations of our approach on the proof-of-concept. 
  
4.1. Initial Setup and Image Acquisition 
 
 In order to perform the procedures described in the next sections, we need the 
image of the physical memory acquired from a Linux machine. To that end, a virtual 
environment was built with the following specifications: 
 Virtualization Software: VMware Workstation 6.5.7 
 Operating System: 32-bit Linux Ubuntu 10.10 – Kernel 2.6.35.22 
 Amount of RAM: 512 MB 
 Hard Drive: 20 GB, with no swap space. 
These configurations were not selected randomly. Indeed, the virtual setup would allow 
us to easily obtain the contents of the RAM, as virtualization software such as VMware 




built) to simulate the memory. When a snapshot of the virtual machine is taken, or when 
it is pause at some point in time, that file (with .vmem extension if VMware is used) can 
be copied and will represent an image of the Ram at that exact moment [47]. On the other 
hand, obtaining the image of the memory from a running full blown system can be 
tedious as discussed in Section 2.1.2.1.  
Ubuntu is one of the most used distributions of Linux; version 10.10 (also called 
Maverick Meerkat) was the latest release at the beginning of our project and is based on 
the 2.6.35 kernel. 
The size of the RAM was chosen to avoid the complexities that a ZONE_HIGHMEM would 
introduce to the virtual to physical address translation (see Section 3.1.2 and [5]), thus it 
was kept below 896MB. The size of the virtual hard drive was chosen arbitrarily, but we 
opted for no swap space. The swapping mechanism uses some preconfigured space on 
disk to extend the available physical memory by moving some pages from the RAM to 
the allocated area on hard drive. The complexity associated with this practice will be 
ignored. 
After building the virtual environment, the next activity involves creating a 
process and running it, at which point the VM can be paused and a snapshot taken so that 
an image of the memory can be copied. Because the created process serves as basis to the 
proof-of-concept implementation and is central to the rest of the experiment, it should be 
specially crafted to be simple and flexible. The following source code is the C program 














 float i, j; 
 
 for (i=0; i<500000; i++) 
  for(j=0; j<50000; j++); 
 
 int fd; 
 
 fd = open("sample.txt", O_RDWR|O_CREAT); 
 
 write(fd, "Done.\n", 6); 
 close(fd); 
 
 return 0; 
} 
 
This program executes a nested for loop, then opens a file called sample.txt (creates it 
if it does not exist) in which it writes the string “Done.”. The file is then closed and the 
program exited. The purpose of the nested for loop is to give us enough time to take a 
snapshot of the VM and even get some information about the process for verification 
purposes in future stages. The constant values were chosen to ensure that the wait time 
was sufficient. A simple call to the sleep() function would have been more predictable, 
unfortunately returning from system calls during the resumption phase is problematic 
(see Chapter 5). 
 Following is the source code to a second C program (test2.c) on which the 
experiment was also performed. This program was designed to verify if data (variables in 










 float i, j; 
 int fd, value; 
 char buf[5]; 
 int k=4; 
 static char dec[] = "0123456789";  
 
 value = 12 + 32; 
 
 for (i=0; i<500000; i++) 
  for (j=0; j<50000; j++); 
  
 value += j; 
 
 do {    /* Implementation of itoa()* / 
  buf[k--] = dec[value%10]; 
  value /= 10; 
 } while(value); 
 
 
 fd = open("sample.txt", O_RDWR|O_CREAT); 
 write(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); 




 return 0; 
} 
 
The variable value is modified before and after the nested loop is executed, and the final 
value (50044) is to be printed into the ―sample.txt‖ file. The do..while statement is 
used to convert value into a string buffer to be written in the output file. 
 Both test.c and test2.c were compiled using the following gcc commands 
(which imply the default level of optimization - level 0): 
gcc –Wall –o test test.c 
gcc –Wall –o test2 test2.c 
The binaries were then run, a snapshot of the VM was taken while the nested loop was 





4.2. Extracting Process Information 
 
 When an investigator is provided with a snapshot of memory for analysis, after 
ensuring the integrity and preservation of the image, there are a number of activities that 
she or he can perform, using the tools and methods described in Section 2.3., to obtain 
information about the state of the machine at acquisition time. The following is a general 
sequence of steps that can be followed in case the examiner wishes to retrieve process-
specific data from an image of RAM in order to resume its execution. For each of these 
steps, we will also present and explain how they were applied to the memory image and 
the test and test2 processes of Section 4.1 by the tool gettsk. Written in Python, 
gettsk takes as input the image file and the task‘s process ID and produces the artifacts 
related to the specified process (The source code for Gettsk is included in Appendix C). 
 
4.2.1. Identifying the Process to be Saved 
The first activity is concerned with determining what processes were running on 
the machine at the moment of acquisition of the RAM, and choosing among them which 
one might be of interest. As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the Linux kernel maintains a 
circular doubly linked list of all the processes loaded in memory. Therefore, by traversing 
the structure, we can obtain the list of running tasks. One of the difficulties here lies on 
finding a starting point. There are two approaches to solve this issue: 
- If the filesystem of the machine is available, the address of the process 




kernel symbol table file /boot/System.map-x (‗x‘ being the kernel version) 
[46]. 
- If the investigator does not have access to files, it is still possible to find the 
address of the task_struct of the swapper process, by combining search 
and known facts about the way Linux manages the memory. For example, 
one can start with searching the image for strings such as ―swapper‖ or 
―init‖ (first two kernel tasks, that are always running on a well-functioning 
Linux system), then use the fact that their PID is respectively 0 and 1 and that 
every kernel address is greater than PAGE_OFFSET (equivalent of 
0xC0000000) to build a heuristic algorithm that would find the address to a 
process‘ task_struct as well as offsets to some of its fields. 
For the purpose of our study, we used the filesystem of the virtual machine, specifically 
the file /boot/System.map-2.6.35-22-generic to read the linear kernel address of the 
init_task: 0xc07c76e0. The actual address in memory is obtained by subtracting 
PAGE_OFFSET (see Section 3.1.2).  
Having the starting point is not enough for the traversal; we need to be able to 
move from one task to the next. The kernel uses the tasks field of the process descriptor 
for each process to link it to its neighbors in the list.  
The offsets to fields in kernel data structures are derived manually by navigating through 
the source code for the structure, accounting for the size of each field (taking into 
consideration the storage size of basic types, for example one byte for long and pointers, 
etc…). Automating the computation of these offsets is problematic because of C 




statements are common and add or remove fields to kernel structures depending on 
certain macros. However, the value of these macros cannot be obtained from the RAM 
image alone.  
Using this procedure, the offsets for the tasks, comm and pid fields of the task_struct 
can be found and used to walkthrough and list the processes running on the machine from 
the memory image (Appendix A contains all the offsets used during our experiment; 
these values are very specific to our environment and apply only to the kernel version 
2.6.35.22). This is exactly what the program ps.py (whose Python source code is in 
Appendix B) does on our proof-of-concept image.  
 
4.2.2. Retrieving the Process’ Artifacts and Metadata 
 The previous subsection explains how to obtain the list of running processes from 
the memory image. The investigator can now identify a specific task that could be of 
interest to the case and proceed to extract the data related to that process from the RAM.  
 
General Information: 
These refer to the data that is used for identification or to determine the basic status of the 
process and include: 
- The Process ID: Integer value uniquely assigned to tasks running on a 
machine. It is mainly used for identification purposes. It is the pid field of the 




- The Process’ name: String also used for identification, excluding the 
execution path. It is the comm field of the process descriptor. In our illustrative 
examples, ―test‖ and ―test2‖ would represent the name. 
- The Execution State: The field state of the task_struct describes the 
running status of the program. If the value is negative, the process is 








Figure 9. Possible values of the execution state 
 
- Process Flags: Provide more details on the status of the task. They can take a 
wide range of values such as PF_STARTING when the process is being created, 
PF_KTHREAD for kernel threads, PF_VCPU if run on a virtual CPU or 
PF_SUPERPRIV if used super-user privileges. The list of all the possible 
options can be found in include/linux/sched.h. 
- Process Credentials: As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, they refer to permissions 
associated with the process. A pointer to a cred structure can be found in the 
task_struct. We can thus obtain the pairs (UID, GID), (SUID, SGID), 
182 #define TASK_RUNNING            0 
183 #define TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE      1 
184 #define TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE    2 
185 #define __TASK_STOPPED          4 
186 #define __TASK_TRACED           8 
... 
191 #define TASK_DEAD               64 
192 #define TASK_WAKEKILL           128 
193 #define TASK_WAKING             256 





(EUID, EGID) and (FSUID, FSGID) which denote the real, saved, effective 
and filesystem-related user and group ID. 
 
The following table summarizes what general information does the gettsk tool extract, 
as well as actual values for our test and test2 processes when statically compiled 
(More in Section 5.2.3). 
 
 




ID task_struct pid 21526 14475 
Name task_struct comm test test2 
State task_struct state 0 0 
Flags task_struct flags 0x00000078 0x00000078 






value for all of 
them) 
1000 (same 
value for all of 
them) 
Table 1. General Information extracted by gettsk 
 
Process Address Space: 
The memory segments and mappings are core components to Linux processes. We first 
collect structural information from the memory descriptor, that is, start and end virtual 
addresses to memory segments (code, data, stack, heap, arguments and environment 




To ease the collection of data from memory, Gettsk implements a generic data structure 
(called Structure) to mimic the different structures used by the Linux kernel to maintain 
process information: 
class Structure:    
 def __init__(self, **kwds): 
  self.__dict__.update(kwds) 
 
 def __str__(self): 
  state = ["%s = 0x%08x" % (att, value) 
   for (att, value) 
   in self.__dict__.items()] 
  
  return '\n'.join(state) 
 
For example, the following vmstruct is used to store information from the memory 
descriptor of a process in the kernel.  
 
vmstruct = Structure(start_code, end_code, 
    start_data, end_data, start_brk, brk, 
    arg_start, arg_end, start_stack,  
    env_start, env_end) 
 
Using the starting address of the task_struct and the configured offsets, gettsk can 
access the data in the RAM image and copy them into the built structures . 
Next, we extract the memory regions‘ metadata and their contents. The Linux 
kernel maintains a linked list, sorted by starting virtual address, to keep track of memory 
areas. The memory descriptor of each process has a field mmap of type vm_area_struct 
that points to the first element of the list of regions. Each vm_area_struct or region 
descriptor has a field vm_next pointing the current area to the next (and a field vm_prev 
pointing to the previous). These can be used to navigate the list of region and extract the 
self-descriptive data for each: vm_start, vm_end, vm_prot, vm_flags, vm_pgoff 




to a file structure from which the pathname of the file can be obtained (refer to Section 
3.2.3).  
For anonymous memory areas, that is, regions that are not mapped to a file on disk 
(vm_file is null), gettsk dumps their contents, page by page, from the memory image. 
This is done by following the following pseudo-algorithm, where PAGE_SIZE represents 
the size of a page frame (4KB on x86 Linux systems): 
 
start 
vaddress =  vm_start 
while (vaddress <= vm_end ) 
 Convert vaddress to physical address 
 Dump page at physical address 





 The CPU registers associated with the running task also have to be saved, as they 
are part of the process state when it is paused. When performing context switching, the 
Linux kernel saves the values of the general registers at the bottom of the Kernel Mode 
Stack of the process [3]. In older versions of Linux, the location of task_struct was 
always right below the Kernel Mode Stack of the process, so the register set could be 
obtained using the following formula (in the case of a 8KB kernel stack, with p 
representing the address of the process descriptor) [52]: 





However, this setup posed a security risk, so, since version 2.6, the Kernel Mode Stack is 
randomly allocated. Luckily, the kernel stores its address in memory. Indeed, the field 
thread.sp0, where thread is a field of task_struct (of type thread_struct - 
structure storing CPU specific data for the process), contains a pointer to the bottom of 
the Kernel Mode stack right where the register set is saved. 
For 32-bit Linux Kernel 2.6 systems, the register set structure (pt_regs) is defined in the 
source code as follows (location arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h): 
struct pt_regs { 
         unsigned long bx; 
         unsigned long cx; 
         unsigned long dx; 
         unsigned long si; 
         unsigned long di; 
         unsigned long bp; 
         unsigned long ax; 
         unsigned long ds; 
         unsigned long es; 
         unsigned long fs; 
         unsigned long gs; 
         unsigned long orig_ax; 
         unsigned long ip; 
         unsigned long cs; 
         unsigned long flags; 
         unsigned long sp; 
         unsigned long ss; 
 }; 
 
The size of this structure is 68 bytes (8 * 17 fields) and thus, the following formula can 
be used to obtain the registers set (See Fig. 10): 
struct pt_regs *regs = ((struct pt_regs *)((unsigned long)(p->thread.sp0) - 68) 
 
With the address of the top of the Kernel Mode Stack, gettsk copies the process 













Figure 10. Finding the Process Register Set 
 
Filesystem information: 
 The interaction between tasks and the filesystem is fundamental to the functioning 
of a computing system. In Linux, files can be of different types: Regular named files, 
directories, symbolic links, device files, sockets or pipes.  
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, the kernel manages an array of file descriptor numbers 
(integers uniquely associated with files used by a task), through the file descriptor table, 
that keeps track of all the files currently opened by the process. Each file descriptor 
number refers to a structure of type file (see Fig. 8), which holds data about the file in 
question and its relationship with the process. 
The tool gettsk does not fully support extracting filesystem information from memory. 
It only collects the pathname of regular files on disk and does not deal with either pipes 
or sockets (See Section 4.3).  
 













 It is possible that the process to be extracted had child processes also running on 
the machine. The kernel keeps track of all the children of a process through a circular 
doubly linked list accessed through the children field of the task_struct. Their 
information should also be retrieved and their hierarchy (child processes might also have 
children) preserved. It would allow investigators to have a more accurate depiction of 
their effects on the system resources, as well as the communication between them.  
Because each of the threads in the hierarchy also has their execution state saved in 
memory, the procedure described so far to retrieve information about a task can be 
repeated for all the threads and saved in a tree-like structure. 
Gettsk does not support retrieving child processes data. This is not problematic for our 
proof-of-concept since out test and test2 processes do not have child processes. 
 
4.3. Saving the Obtained Results 
 
 All the artifacts extracted in the previous steps are to be saved in a simple, 
efficient and portable format. Indeed, the size of the information collected can be 
considerable, especially if the contents of memory regions are dumped. Also, it should be 
simple enough for the investigators to be able to decipher the data and find evidence. One 
of the goals of our exercise is to determine if it is possible to resume the execution of the 
saved process, potentially on a different host. Therefore, the requirement that the output 
should be portable plays a special role in these circumstances. 
The Gettsk tool organizes the retrieved data in an XML (eXtensible Markup Language) 




defines rules for building files that are both human and machine readable. Moreover, it is 
customizable, as users can construct and implement specific formats that valid files have 
to follow: they are called schemas. Appendix D contains the XML schema (defined using 
XML Schema Definition or XSD language) used by gettsk to store the recovered data. 
The following is an excerpt of the resulting file for out test process, displaying how the 
name, pid, credentials and register set are stored: 
 
<?xml version="1.0" ?> 
<process arch="x86" kernel_version="2.6.35" magic_number="FFC0"> 
 <pid> 
  21526 
 </pid> 
 <name> 
  test 
 </name> 
 <state> 
  0 
 </state> 
 <flags>  
0x00000078 
<flags/> 
 <credentials egid="1000" euid="1000" fsgid="1000" fsuid="1000" gid="1000" 
sgid="1000" suid="1000" uid="1000"/> 





For binary streams that are dumped in the output, such as CPU registers or the contents of 
memory areas, base64 encoding is used to transform the data in textual form. This was 
used first to accommodate XML standards that require the use of Unicode encoding. 







4.4. Limitations of Gettsk 
 
The gettsk implementation described in the previous section is developed as a 
proof-of-context for extracting process information from an image of RAM. There are 
still a lot of unexplored or unsupported features that could be of interest to an 
investigator. They include: 
- Determining offsets to fields of kernel structures in memory: This is probably 
the most important issue the tool still faces. The offsets and configurations 
displayed in Appendix A were obtained by hand and are specific to a version 
of the Linux Kernel. Therefore, for an investigator to use this tool on another 
Linux platform, these values have to be reexamined and reevaluated. This 
shortcoming is tied to the fact that the tool does not have much room for 
extension to different versions of the kernel. 
- Files: We mentioned in Section 4.2.2 that gettsk does not support extracting 
information about pipes and sockets (although they might contain knowledge 
valuable to investigators such as external IP addresses and/or inter-process 
communication data). They require information about other processes or 
external entities that we could not obtain (although they may exist) from the 
memory image. For files on disk, only their pathnames is saved to allow the 
investigator to at least have a list, which can be examined further for potential 
evidence. Our proof-of-concept processes do not have any open file, therefore 
the outcome of our experiment is not compromised, but in case a task of 




including the file descriptor number, the current position in the file, its 
permissions and open mode (read, write, etc…). To prepare for the 
resumption phase, these files should be packaged together with the XML 
output file and transported to the host machine. 
- Process Hierarchy: Gettsk also does not store any information about parent 
and child processes. In an ideal situation, every task that is linked to the 
process passed as input should be extracted and saved following the same 
hierarchy (i.e. with details about their relationships with each other). 
- Processes executing a system call: It is possible that at the moment the RAM 
was collected, a process of interest was waiting on a system call (this would 
have been the case for our test process if the sleep() system call was used, 
refer to Section 4.1). In such a case, in addition to the process information, 
the state of the kernel should be captured. Gettsk does not explore this 
option. 
- Inter-Process Communication (IPC): Tasks often cooperate with each other 
through techniques such as message passing, synchronization or Remote 
Procedure Calls (RPC). In this Chapter, apart from sockets for networking 
and pipes, we did not discuss what other kernel objects are required to 
perform IPC. They include signals, message queues, held semaphores, shared 
memory metadata and of course the other processes involved in the 
transactions.  
 
5. RESUMING THE EXECUTION OF AN EXTRACTED PROCESS (MEMEXEC) 
 
 We have successfully extracted process information from an image of the RAM 
of a Linux system. We now focus on the question of whether it is possible to resume the 
execution of the task using the data collected. It turns out that under certain 
circumstances the answer is affirmative. This chapter will first describe what type of 
configuration is required from the machine in which the resumption will occur, and then 
will follow a discussion on how this can be actually be performed. A tool, memexec built 
to implement these recommendations on our proof-of-concept experiment will also be 
presented and explained, as well as its results and limitations. 
 
5.1. Requirements and Design Options 
 
 Earlier in this thesis, we mentioned the need for the environment in which 
malware analysis is performed to be contained. This is one of the main pillars of our 
approach to resume a process obtained from a memory image. However, the process 
cannot just be transported onto any machine and revived; there is a very good chance that 
it will not work at all. To ensure that the resources and configurations are the ones 
expected by the task, the host should be as close as possible to the initial system. Ideally, 
the machine from which the RAM was acquired would be the primary choice for 
resumption. Unfortunately, it is usually a production system which might be 




evidence, misguide the investigator and/or propagate malware to other computers. The 
following are some of the most important configurations that the host machine should 
have: 
- The underlying hardware of the host must be the same as the original. 
Processes are built and compiled for a specific machine and are highly 
dependent on the CPU architecture. 
- Similarly, it is preferable for the operating system of the receiving machine to 
match with the initial computer. However, this requirement is weaker than 
the restriction on the hardware: It is possible that the resumption process will 
work on different versions of the same operating system, especially for Linux 
if they are from the same patch level (version 2.6.34 and 2.6.35 for example) 
or if the new kernel is a recompile of the original. 
- Unless it was (or will be) used by the saved process, a file on disk does not 
need to be replicated in the host machine. However, because the pathname of 
opened and mapped files depend on the filesystem of the original machine 
(root directory and current working directory), it might be necessary for some 
files to exist in specific locations. It is possible to work around this 
requirement, by manually renaming the files. 
- Similarly to files on disk, the users and groups existing in the original system 
are not necessary to the resumption of the task. But, in case the owner of the 
initial process needs to be restored, the permissions of the user/group in 
question should be the same in the two machines, especially on resources 





 After the data has been extracted from the memory image and the receiving 
machine is adequately configured, the resumption can begin. The general idea behind 
resuming the execution of a process involves moving the saved information into the 
appropriate locations and launching its execution. For the Linux kernel, this activity can 
be performed either from User Space or from Kernel Space. 
From User Space, this can be achieved by using the tracing capabilities of Linux (with 
the ptrace() call for example) and other system calls such as mmap() to recreate 
memory mappings or file operations (open(), write(), etc…) for opened files. This 
would allow for a cross-version solution, since most system calls are kept across kernel 
changes. This method might work for very simple processes, but issues will quickly arise 
for more complex tasks, as system calls do not permit users to change specific values in 
kernel data structures, which might be desirable or required in some cases. Furthermore, 
it would be difficult to modify some process metadata such as name, pid or execution 
state from user space without hacking the kernel. 
The alternative solution involves restoring the saved artifacts while running in kernel 
mode. This gives direct access to kernel data structures and thus all the changes necessary 
for process resumption can be made. However, this technique is very kernel-dependent, 
thus the solution might not work in different kernel versions. Here, two options are 
available: Either patch the kernel or use a Loadable Kernel Module (LKM). Patching the 
kernel implies creation of new system calls and/or modification of existing kernel code 




machine restarted every time a new functionality has to be added or modified, which can 
become problematic and cumbersome for large project. 
Using a loadable kernel module offers more flexibility and is much easier on the 
developer. Indeed, a kernel module is a set of functionalities that can be added and 
removed from the kernel (using the insmod and rmmod commands respectively) without 
rebuilding it. They are particularly useful when creating drivers for devices and adding 
them to the kernel. 
The kernel module approach is the one used for our experiment and the toolset memexec 
includes the memlkm program implementing a pseudo device driver (/dev/memexec), 
which will permit us to execute customized code in kernel mode.  
 
5.2. Restoring Process Artifacts 
5.2.1. General Methodology 
 In Section 4.2, we described ways to retrieve information about a running process 
from memory and prepare a package that would help reconstruct the extracted process 
and resume its execution on a similar environment. We now discuss how to achieve such 
reconstruction. Two basic methods can be considered here: 
- Create a new kernel task from scratch containing only information from the 
saved process and launch its execution. 
- Use a process already running on the host and modify its behavior and 





 The first approach is similar to the proposal made by Ilo [28] (see Section 2.4), 
which involves building a process from the ground up (implies creating a new 
task_struct and a new address space), insert data saved during the extraction stage and 
schedule its execution. This would be ideal from a forensic perspective, given that all the 
information about the revived process will be known to the investigator. But, this turns 
out to be a daunting task without the help of the operating system because it requires 
accounting for every single kernel structure and performing the appropriate initialization 
for each of them. If even one variable or structure is not correctly instantiated, a system 
crash or an unwanted behavior can happen.  
The second method on the other hand, is closer to the restart component of the CRAK 
process migration tool [48], where the program that parses the ―checkpoint‖ file (file 
containing information about a saved process) is the one being modified to resemble the 
original task. This approach is simple since the operating system already built the 
foundation for the preexisting process and so, only the insertion of saved information 
(such as memory regions and the register set) is to be performed. However, artifacts 
associated with the modified task remain in memory and might have effects on the 
resumed task. But, since the process is chosen, its impact is known to the investigator. 
This method is the one used during our experiment. 
 The following steps give a general overview of what activities should be done to 
resume the execution context of a saved process: 
1. Create a new process: This is optional depending on the method used. 
2. Modify the process to insert information gathered from memory. 




The next subsections will illustrate how these activities were achieved during our proof-
of-concept experiment, giving details on the inner-workings of the memexec toolset. 
 
5.2.2. Implementation (Memexec) 
 Memexec, written in C (see Appendix E), is divided in two components: a loadable 
kernel module (memlkm) that will be used to restore the artifacts of the saved process and 
a User Space program that parses the input files and launches the kernel mode operations. 
After the kernel module is loaded into the system, memexec takes as input an XML file 
following the format described in Chapter 4, and performs the following activities: 
 
1. Parsing the XML file into data variables 
 Using the libxml2 library (see Makefile in Appendix E), the input file is parsed 
and the information is saved in a memproc data structure, storing all the process artifacts 
contained in the file. The structure is defined as follows: 
struct memproc { 
 
 unsigned long old_pid, state; /* PID and state */ 
 int flags;      /* Process Flags */ 
 int seg_num;     /* Number of Segments */ 
 int file_num;       /* Number of Open Files */ 
  
 char * regs;  /* Bytes holding the register set */ 
 char name[16];  /* Name */ 
 struct credentials memcred; /* process user credentials */ 
 struct vmstruct vm_map;  /* Memory descriptor info */ 
 struct segments * seglist; /* Memory regions */ 
 struct open_file * filelist; /* List of open files */ 







It is also at this stage that the base64 encoded data in the XML input file is transformed 
back into binary streams. 
 
2. Switching to Kernel Mode and restoring extracted artifacts 
 After parsing the data from the XML file, the next step involves rebuilding the 
saved process. Memexec then opens the device file /dev/memexec and through the 
device‘s Input/Output Control (ioctl), it can execute kernel mode instructions. The 
variable of type memproc containing the saved information is passed to the ioctl call. As 
we mentioned earlier, the tool does not create a new process, rather it modifies the 
program used to open the device file (also called memexec in our case). Next the task‘s 
metadata is restored as follows: 
 
General Information: 
 When in Kernel Mode, the address of the task_struct of the currently running 
process can be obtained using the macro current. Therefore it is simple to access and 
replace fields of the process descriptor. For example, the name of the process (which is 
the comm field of task_struct) is accessed with: current->comm. 
Therefore, the name, process flags and execution state can all be restored by replacing the 
value appropriate fields in the process descriptor by the corresponding data from the 
saved process. 
Concerning the process ID, the saved value must not be in use in the current system and 
must not be larger than a maximum (can be found in /proc/sys/kernel/pid_max). 




not support restoring the PID of the process. This does not affect the resumption of our 
test and test2 processes, but it might be problematic to a forensic investigation if the 
task of interest uses its PID during its execution. 
We mentioned in Section 5.1 that if the credentials associated with the task extracted 
from memory should be restored, the corresponding users and groups (at least their IDs) 
must exist on the host machine and have the same privileges on the resources used by the 
resumed process. If this is satisfied, a new credentials data structure can be created with 
the values obtained from the extracted process. Memexec does not support restoring the 
credentials. 
 
Process Address Space: 
 First we have to restore the virtual memory structure. Each segment attribute has 
to be replaced with its saved counterpart. The memory descriptor of the process can be 
directly accessed through the mm field of the process descriptor. Therefore, the following 
line of code will successfully change the address of the beginning of the code section for 
the process (tmp holds vm_struct data for the current region as defined in Section 
4.2.2). This can be repeated with the other segments to reconstitute the virtual memory 
structure of the saved task: 
current->mm->start_code  = tmp.start_code;  
 Each memory area is either mapped to a file or anonymously. In the first case, the 
region can be restored by remapping the file in question. Of course, the requirement that 
files on disk to be restored must exist on the host machine (see below and Section 5.1) 





do_mmap_pgoff(f, vm_start, size, mmap_prot, mmap_flags, pgoff);  
  
The argument f is of type file *, and represents the file to be mapped; vmstart is the 
saved stating virtual address for the region; size is the amount of space to be mapped 
(obtained by subtracting the saved start virtual address from the end address of the 
memory area); mmap_prot designates the protection flags for the frames  of the region; 
mmap_flags specify what kind of region is mapped (for example, because stack regions 
grow downwards, the macro VM_GROWSDOWN is used); pgoff is the offset at which the file 
should be mapped. 
For anonymously mapped regions, the do_mmap() kernel function first allocates the 
needed amount of space, then the contents of the original memory area can be copied into 
the reserved space using the function copy_to_user() (This function permits to copy 
data from kernel space into a virtual memory location of the current process). 
 Memexec creates these new mappings without getting rid of the existing ones on 
the task being modified. Every time this was attempted, the process was killed by the 
Operating System. Thus the memory regions of the modified process are still present in 
memory after the address space is restored, except those that occupied virtual addresses 
used by the extracted process (they were replaced by memexec). 
 
CPU Registers: 
The Linux kernel provides a convenient function to locate the register set (from the 
kernel mode stack) of the currently running process: task_pt_regs(current), defined 
in the source file arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h. Thus, the following lines of C 




struct pt_regs * regs; 
regs = task_pt_regs(current);     
*regs = *tmp;  // tmp is a pointer to the saved registers 
 
Filesystem and Child Process Information: 
 To recover the file table of the process extracted from a RAM image, all the 
regular files must be reopened on the host machine and their position pointer moved to 
the saved location. More importantly, because it is used by the task to refer to the file, 
their file descriptor number must be restored as well. This can be done either by using 
both the open() and dup() system call from User Space or by directly manipulating the 
file table data structure in kernel mode [52]. 
As we mentioned in Section 5.1, the file in question must exist on the new system and 
have the same pathname and permissions as in the initial machine. If for some reason the 
pathname requirement is not an option (for example, subdirectories might not exist or 
security concerns might exist), the investigator can manually change the location of the 
file in the input data to suit his configurations. 
Our experimental tool memexec does not support restoring the file table. Also, pipes and 
sockets were not explored: they imply communications with other processes or other 
machines, while our study was focused on the extraction and resumption of a single 
process. 
Similarly, reviving a group of potentially related tasks is not included in our proof-of-
concept. Therefore child processes were not considered. The general idea behind 
resuming the execution of a group of processes involves resuming each thread separately 
and reconstructing the links between them through kernel objects (parents, siblings, 






 After the process artifacts are restored, the kernel module can exit and yield the 
execution back to User Space. At this point, the next instruction will be fetched from the 
Instruction Pointer register and executed in the new context, which in theory will resume 
the execution of the original process in the new host. 
During our experiment, the process was successfully revived. Indeed, when memlkm 
returned with no errors, rather than the next instruction of memexec (closing the device 
file), the nested loop in our test and test2 processes was executed. 
The rest of the program behaved differently depending on the initial compilation method: 
 
5.2.3.1 Results for Dynamic Compilation: 
 In our first attempt at the experiment, the test program was compiled 
dynamically, the RAM acquired, the metadata of the test extracted with gettsk and the 
process resumed. 
In the original machine, while the nested loop of test process was being executed, we 
were able to print its memory mappings using the Linux‘s /proc pseudo-filesystem as 
seen in Fig. 11. 
The top 4 lines on the picture represent the last lines of a ps command run on the system 
to get the PID of test; then the /proc/PID/maps command was run to display the 
mappings. The first column in the output represents the start and end virtual addresses 
used by the region. The second shows the set of permissions associated with frames of 




any). The last three are respectively the device major and minor, the inode and the 
pathname of the file mapped, if any. 
 
 
Figure 11. Original Mappings for the Dynamically Compiled test Program 
 
The same procedure was repeated when the process was resumed and it resulted in Figure 
12. The bold lines show the mappings restored from the original test process. The other 
mappings are associated with the process launched by memexec that were not deleted. 
This picture also demonstrates that the name of the process was successfully modified. 
Unfortunately, after the nested loop, the process threw a segmentation fault while 
executing the open() function. We later discovered that every instruction that did not 
involve a system call can be successfully run, suggesting that the problem was associated 
with the dynamic linking of the shared libraries. We therefore opted to do the same 
























Figure 12. Restored Mappings for the Dynamically Compiled test Process 
 
5.2.3.2 Results for Static Compilation: 
 When a program is built statically, the needed libraries are merged into the binary 
which thus becomes a standalone executable. The resulting binary is obviously larger 
than its dynamic counterpart, but the dynamic loading mechanism is removed. Thus, the 
airness@ubuntu:~/Desktop/Code/Memexec$ ps aux | grep test 
airness  17908  0.0  0.2   5192  1280 pts/0    D+   07:14   0:00 ./test 
airness  17912  0.0  0.1   4012   760 pts/1    S+   07:14   0:00 grep test 
 
airness@ubuntu:~/Desktop/Code/Memexec$ sudo cat /proc/17908/maps 
00110000-00112000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 921753     /lib/libdl-2.12.1.so 
00112000-00269000          r-xp    00000000      08:01     921748              /lib/libc-2.12.1.so 
0026a000-0026c000          r--p     00157000      08:01     921748              /lib/libc-2.12.1.so 
0026c000-0026d000          rw-p   00159000      08:01     921748              /lib/libc-2.12.1.so 
0026d000-00270000          rw-p   00000000      00:00     0                        [heap] 
00610000-00767000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 921748     /lib/libc-2.12.1.so 
00767000-00768000 ---p 00157000 08:01 921748     /lib/libc-2.12.1.so 
00768000-0076a000 r--p 00157000 08:01 921748     /lib/libc-2.12.1.so 
0076a000-0076b000 rw-p 00159000 08:01 921748     /lib/libc-2.12.1.so 
0076b000-0076e000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0          [heap] 
00823000-00847000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 921756     /lib/libm-2.12.1.so 
00847000-00848000 r--p 00023000 08:01 921756     /lib/libm-2.12.1.so 
00848000-00849000 rw-p 00024000 08:01 921756     /lib/libm-2.12.1.so 
00974000-00990000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 921741     /lib/ld-2.12.1.so 
00990000-00991000 r--p 0001b000 08:01 921741     /lib/ld-2.12.1.so 
00991000-00992000 rw-p 0001c000 08:01 921741     /lib/ld-2.12.1.so 
00b58000-00b59000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0          [vdso] 
00d2f000-00d42000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 917700     /lib/libz.so.1.2.3.4 
00d42000-00d43000 r--p 00012000 08:01 917700     /lib/libz.so.1.2.3.4 
00d43000-00d44000 rw-p 00013000 08:01 917700     /lib/libz.so.1.2.3.4 
00d82000-00ea4000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 1050096    /usr/lib/libxml2.so.2.7.7 
00ea4000-00ea8000 r--p 00121000 08:01 1050096    /usr/lib/libxml2.so.2.7.7 
00ea8000-00ea9000 rw-p 00125000 08:01 1050096    /usr/lib/libxml2.so.2.7.7 
00ea9000-00eaa000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0          [heap] 
00f01000-00f1d000           r-xp    00000000      08:01     921741               /lib/ld-2.12.1.so 
00f1d000-00f1e000           r--p     0001b000      08:01     921741               /lib/ld-2.12.1.so 
00f1e000-00f1f000           rw-p    0001c000       08:01     921741               /lib/ld-2.12.1.so 
00fae000-00faf000           rwxp    00000000      00:00     0                         [heap] 
08048000-08049000         r-xp     00000000      08:01     919388               /home/airness/Desktop/test 
08049000-0804a000         r--p      00000000      08:01     919388               /home/airness/Desktop/test 
0804a000-0804b000         rw-p    00001000      08:01     919388               /home/airness/Desktop/test 
0804b000-0804c000 r--p 00002000 08:01 541910     /home/airness/Desktop/Code/Memexec/memexec 
0804c000-0804d000 rw-p 00003000 08:01 541910     /home/airness/Desktop/Code/Memexec/memexec 
09b00000-09b63000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0          [heap] 
b7713000-b7714000         rw-p    00000000      00:00     0  
b7721000-b7723000         rw-p    00000000      00:00     0  
b77c4000-b77c6000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0  
b77d2000-b77d5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0  
bfc4a000-bfc6b000           rw-p    00000000      00:00    0                         [stack] 




memory mappings do not include shared libraries anymore (see Fig. 13 for the mappings 
of a test process run after a static compilation). 
 
Figure 13. Original Mappings for the Statically Compiled test Process 
 
With a statically compiled test process, the resumption procedure worked correctly. 
Indeed, all the instructions following the nested loop were successfully executed: the file 
―sample.txt‖ was created and the string ―Done.‖ written into the file.  
Similarly, for the test2 example, the resumption worked and the correct value (50044) 
stored in the value variable was also printed into the output file, demonstrating that 
program data were successfully preserved the procedure. 
The only hiatus happened when the task was being terminated. The following errors were 
displayed for the test process (a similar message was output for the test2 task): 
*** glibc detected *** ./test: free(): invalid pointer: 0x080cee20 *** 
Segmentation fault 
This error message is usually thrown when an unallocated resource is being deleted, 
suggesting that this might be a consequence to the data of the memexec process still 








5.2.4. Limitations of Memexec 
 Although memexec illustrates that it is possible to revive a process extracted from 
an image of memory, there are restrictions, unsupported features and unexplored 
possibilities still associated with this work. Some of them are listed below: 
- Dealing with dynamic loading: The fact that memexec fails to execute system 
calls at the resumption phase when the program is dynamically compiled is an 
important shortcoming. Investigators will be faced, more often than not, with 
dynamically-linked malware which are bound to make system calls to access 
resources.  
- Deleting unused data from the memexec process: As mentioned in Section 5.2, 
the memory mappings of the process being modified by memexec are not all 
expunged and their effects on the final result are unknown. This may be 
problematic to a forensic investigation, as the evidence discovered using our 
method might be rejected in court. 
- Unsupported process artifacts: A number of process information is not 
restored the tool such as open files, pipes and sockets, process ID, user 
credentials and child processes data. 
- Restrictions on the host system: The requirements that the host machine 
should have, as described in Section 5.1, do not give much flexibility to the 
investigator. For example, the memexec tool does not provide an alternative to 
restoring the memory mappings when the Filesystem is not available, even 




 In this thesis, we demonstrated that given an image of the RAM of a Linux 
machine, it is possible to extract enough information about a specific running process to 
be able to resume its execution on another environment. We also presented two proof-of-
concept tools gettsk and memexec that respectively retrieve process artifacts from the 
memory image and use the saved data to revive the program. 
 Obtaining the memory image of a running machine in the first place is not easy. 
Although researchers developed both hardware and software methods to acquire the 
RAM, the constantly-changing nature of non-volatile memory pose a challenge to 
investigators. However, most virtualization software allows users to take a snapshot of a 
virtual machine and collect the contents of the memory from a file on disk. We took 
advantage of this feature to create memory images of Linux systems that we used to 
perform our experiments. 
 When the memory image is available, the first step involves identifying which of 
the tasks running on the machine, at the moment of capture, is of interest. This is done by 
parsing the RAM for the circular doubly-linked list of process descriptors maintained by 
the Linux kernel (from which all the other process-related kernel structures can be 
obtained as described in Chapter 3), in order to get the list of all the tasks loaded in 
memory. At this point, accessing the data is a question of determining the offsets of 
specific fields in the kernel data structures. The gettsk tool proceeds to store the 




 To be able to resume the process extracted from the RAM, the receiving system 
should be prepared adequately (see Section 5.1): the operating system, the underlying 
hardware as well as other resources such as the filesystem (especially those used by the 
task) should be similar to their equivalent in the original machine, to ensure a proper 
continuation of the execution of the task. It is also an imperative that the host be separate 
from production systems, so that potential infection is contained. 
 The actual resumption procedure can be performed in Linux either form User 
Space or Kernel Space, but making changes while in kernel mode allows direct access to 
the data structures that need to be restored for the execution to continue. That‘s the reason 
why the memexec toolset includes a loadable kernel module (memlkm) which does the 
actual work of placing the saved process‘ artifacts in their appropriate locations. 
 Although our experiment worked for our proof-of-concept configurations, both 
tools gettsk and memexec fail to consider some process-related data that could come in 
handy for an investigation such as open files and the ability to complete the resumption 
when the initial process is dynamically compiled (see Sections 4.4 and 5.2.4). This work 
is designed for a single process at the time and thus Inter Process Communications as 
well as network connections are not supported. Moreover, the implementation is highly 
dependent on the version of the kernel used during the experiment (Linux kernel 2.6.35) 
and will not function correctly on different platforms. 
 
Future Work: 
 Our work described how a number of process-specific information can be 




the task on another host. This will increase the chances for an investigator to discover 
and/or consolidate evidence, from a forensic analysis of the contents of the RAM. But as 
the previous paragraph suggests, there is still room for improvement, including the 
following: 
- Dynamically compiled binaries and system calls: As discussed in Sections 
5.2.3.1 and 5.2.4, our proposed solution does not work for dynamically 
compiled programs, probably due to the remnants of the process being 
modified during the resumption phase. This issue might be solved by restoring 
the information of the extracted process using a task created from scratch. It is 
worth noting that failures specifically occur when system calls are being 
executed, which suggest discrepancies with the process‘ libraries and/or the 
state of the kernel (which is not extracted by gettsk). 
- Extract and restore the files opened by the process: Regular files, network 
sockets and pipes (see Section 4.4). This category can also include providing 
alternatives to recovering memory mappings. Our proposal requires that the 
files mapped in memory be present at the same location in the host system, 
but this might be difficult to fulfill, especially for included libraries. Since 
their contents are actually stored in RAM, they could be harnessed at the 
extraction phase to alleviate the requirement. 
- Extend support to groups of tasks, their relationships and transactions 
between them: Neither child, sibling, nor parent processes are taken into 
account in our project, although they might be of use to a forensic 




of running processes and their relationships is thus a desirable feature that 
could be pursued in the future. Similarly, if the tasks of interest are involved 
in inter-process communications, they should be captured and revived with 
their transactions preserved. 
- Extend support to different kernel versions and different platforms: Both tools 
introduced in this document are very kernel-dependent, primarily due to 
differences in data structures between versions of the Linux Kernel. A first 
step towards solving this issue could be automating the determination of 
fields‘ offsets in kernel structures, as discussed in Section 4.4. A more long 
term solution could involve a method used by Volatility [50], which allows 
the users to create and add profiles for specific kernel versions, thus providing 
more flexibility and control to investigators. 
 
 
APPENDIX A: OFFSETS AND OTHER CONFIGURATIONS 
 
 The following Python declarations (config.py) represent the offsets of elements 
in the kernel structures used during the experimental phase of this project. It also includes 
hard coded configurations such as PAGE_OFFSET and the address of init_task found 
in the System.map symbol table. 
 
******************** CONFIG.PY  ****************************** 
 
init_task  = 0xc07c76e0   # "Swapper" address obtained from System.map 
kernel_start  = 0xc0000000     # PAGE_OFFSET 
page_size  = 0x1000      # Size of a Page: 4KB 
 
page_mask  = 0x00000fff      
 
regs_size  = 68     # size of register set 




***** Task_struct Offsets: see include/linux/sched.h ******** 
""" 
 
state_offset  = 0 
stack_offset  = 8 
flags_offset = 24 
 
task_offset  = 432 
comm_offset  = 752 
pid_offset  = 508 
mm_offset  = 460 
parent_offset  = 524 
 
cred_offset  = 724 
sp0_offset = 808 
fs_offset  = 908 
files_offset  = 912 
sighand_offset    = 924 
sigpending_offset = 952 




******  mm_struct Offsets: see include/linux/mm_types.h ********* 
""" 
 
mmap_offset  = 0 
pgd_offset  = 40 
 
vmstruct_offset   = 124  # Offset for memory mappings of vm structures 
    # such as start_code, start_data, start_stack, etc... 
 
""" 






vm_mm_offset  = 0 
vm_start_offset  = 4 
vm_end_offset  = 8 
vm_next_offset  = 12 
vm_prev_offset  = 16 
vm_pgprot_offset  = 20 
vm_pgoff_offset  = 72 
vm_flags_offset  = 20 
vm_file_offset  = 76 
 
""" 
  Files_struct, fdtable, file, dentry and inode Offsets:      
    see: include/linux/fdtable.h 
      include/linux/fs.h 
      include/linux/dcache.h 
""" 
 
fdt_offset  = 4  # File Table offset 
fd_offset  = 4  # Array of file descritpor (fd) offset 
 
dentry_offset  = 12   
 
d_parent_offset  = 28  # Dentry's parent offset 
name_len_offset  = 36 
d_name_offset  = 40  # Dentry's Name offset 
 




APPENDIX B: LISTING RUNNING PROCESSES 
 
 Source code in Python of ps.py that lists the running processes from a Linux 






from config import *             # See Appendix A: config.py 
 
def usage(arg): 
 print "" 
 print " Usage: %s <memory_file>" % (os.path.basename(arg)) 
 print "" 
 
def printline(addr, f):                      # Print process info 
 current = addr + pid_offset 
 f.seek(current) 
 ret, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
 print '%4d'.ljust(10) % ret , 
 
 current = addr + parent_offset 
 f.seek(current) 
 ret, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
 current = (ret - kernel_start) + pid_offset 
 f.seek(current) 
 ret, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
 print '%4d'.ljust(10) % ret , 
 
 if (debug): 
  current = addr + cred_offset 
  f.seek(current) 
  current, = (struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)))  
  current = current - kernel_start + 4 
  f.seek(current) 
  print '%4d'.ljust(10) % (struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))), 
  print '0x%8x'.ljust(15) % (addr + kernel_start), 
 
 current = addr + comm_offset 
 f.seek(current) 
 print '%16s'.ljust(25) % (f.read(16)) 
 
################################ MAIN ################################# 
debug = 0 
line = "" 
 




fields = "PID ".ljust(15) + "PPID".ljust(10)  # print headings 
if (debug): 
 fields += "PID".ljust(10) 
 fields += "ADDRESS(Hex)".ljust(20) 
 




init = init_task - kernel_start 
dumpfile = open(sys.argv[1], "rb") 
 
current_task = init 
printline(current_task, dumpfile) 
dumpfile.seek(current_task + task_offset) 
val, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4)) 
current_task = (val - kernel_start) - task_offset 
 
while (current_task != init): 
 printline(current_task, dumpfile) 
 dumpfile.seek(current_task + task_offset) 
 val, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4)) 




APPENDIX C: GETTSK SOURCE CODE 
 
 This is the source code for the gettsk tool, made up of three files (the two files 
structures.py and gettsk.py printed here, plus config.py in Appendix A). 
 






from config import * 
# from gettsk import * 
 
class Structure:  # Collection of items to simulate kernel structures 
 def __init__(self, **kwds): 
  self.__dict__.update(kwds) 
 
 def __str__(self): 
  state = ["%s = 0x%08x" % (att, value) 
   for (att, value) 
   in self.__dict__.items()] 
  
  return '\n'.join(state) 
 
 
class AddresSpace:   # mm_struct in Unix 
 
 def __init__(self, address): 
   
  self.base_addr = address - kernel_start 
  self.mmap_addr = self.base_addr + mmap_offset 
  self.pgd_addr  = self.base_addr + pgd_offset 
 
 def getVmStruct(self, f): # Get vm structure for each Process Address Space 
    
  f.seek(self.base_addr + vmstruct_offset) 
 
  start_code, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  end_code, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  start_data, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  end_data, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  start_brk, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  brk, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  start_stack, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  arg_start, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  arg_end, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  env_start, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  env_end, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
 
  vmstruct = Structure(start_code = start_code, end_code = end_code, 
          start_data = start_data, end_data = end_data, 
          start_brk = start_brk, brk = brk, 
          arg_start = arg_start, arg_end = arg_end, 
          start_stack = start_stack,  
          env_start = env_start, env_end = env_end) 
 
  return vmstruct 
 
 
 def getAllVmAreas(self, f):  # A list of all Memory Regions 
 
  seglist = [] 
  f.seek(self.mmap_addr) 
  address, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  vm = VmArea(address) 
  check_addr = address - kernel_start 
  vmarea = vm.getVmArea(f) 





  while stop or vmarea.addr != check_addr : 
   seglist.append(vmarea) 
   vm = vm.getNext(f) 
    if vm == None : 
    break 
   vmarea = vm.getVmArea(f) 
   stop = False 
 
  return seglist 
 
 def getPgd(self, f): 
 
  pgd_addr = self.pgd_addr 
  f.seek(pgd_addr) 
  pgd, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
   
  return pgd 
  
 
class VmArea:     # vm_area_struct in Linux 
  
 def __init__(self, address): 
  
  self.base_addr = address - kernel_start 
  self.next = None 
  self.prev = None 
 
 def getNext(self, f):    # Get next VmArea : vm_next 
 
  f.seek(self.base_addr + vm_next_offset) 
  addr, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
 
  if addr == 0: 
   return None 
 
  self.next = VmArea(addr) 
  return self.next 
 
 
 def getVmArea(self, f):     # Get a memory region 
   
  f.seek(self.base_addr + vm_start_offset) 
  vm_start, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  vm_end, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
   
  f.seek(self.base_addr + vm_pgprot_offset) 
  vm_pgprot, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  vm_flags, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
   
  f.seek(self.base_addr + vm_pgoff_offset) 
  vm_pgoff, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  vm_file, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) # file struct address or None 
 
  vmarea = Structure(addr = self.base_addr, vm_start = vm_start,  
   vm_end = vm_end, 
       vm_pgprot=vm_pgprot, vm_flags=vm_flags,  
   vm_pgoff = vm_pgoff, 
       vm_file=vm_file) 
 
  return vmarea 
  




 def __init__(self, address): 
   
  self.base_address = address - kernel_start 
  self.start = None 
  self.end = None 
 
 def getFilePath(self, f):  # Get File path and Name from File Descriptor 
  
  filename = "" 
 
  f.seek(self.base_address + dentry_offset) 
  dentry, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  dentry -= kernel_start 
 
  f.seek(dentry + d_parent_offset) 




   
  f.seek(dentry + name_len_offset) 
  size, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  name_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  name_addr -= kernel_start 
  f.seek(name_addr) 
  name = f.read(size) 
  
  if name == "" : 
   return "" 
    
  while name != "/" and name != "anon_inode:": 
    
   if filename == "" : 
    filename = name 
   else: 
    filename = name + '/' + filename 
   
   if len(filename) > 100: 
    break 
   dentry = parent - kernel_start 
   f.seek(dentry + d_parent_offset) 
   parent, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
 
   f.seek(dentry + name_len_offset) 
   size, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
   name_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
   name_addr -= kernel_start 
   f.seek(name_addr) 
   name = f.read(size) 
  
   if name == "" or name == "anon_inode:": 
    return filename 
   
  filename = '/' + filename 
 
  return filename 
 
 def getFilevmAreas(self, seglist):   # Return vm_areas of a file from list of 
all vm_Areas 
 
  l = [] 
  for vmarea in seglist : 
   if vmarea.vm_file == (self.base_address + kernel_start) : 
    l.append(vmarea) 
    if self.start == None : 
     self.start = vmarea.vm_start 
    if self.end == None : 
     self.end = vm_area.vm_end 
 
    if self.start + vmarea.vm_pgoff * page_size > self.end : 
     self.end = vmarea.vm_end 
     
  return l 
     
******************** END STRUCTURES.PY ****************************** 
 
 







import base64      # For data encoding 
from xml.dom.minidom import Document 
 
from config import * 





 print " Usage: %s -f <memory_file> [-o <output_file>] [-v] -p <pid>" % (os.path.basename(arg)) 
 print "" 
 print "       -f <memory_file> : Memory image file." 




 print "       -v               : Verbose." 
 print "       -p <pid>         : PID of process to extract." 
 print "" 
 
 
def check_options(argv):  # Verify Command Line Options 
  
 v = 0    # verbose 
 p = 0    # pid 
 f = ""      # Memory Image File 
 out = "output.xml"  # Output File 
 
 
 o = "hvf:o:p:" 
 try: 
  
  options = getopt.getopt(argv[1:], o) 
  opts = dict(options[0]) 
  extra = options[1] 
 
  if ((len(opts) == 0) or ("-h" in opts)): 
   usage(argv[0]) 
   sys.exit(0) 
 
  if ("-v" in opts):    
   v = 1 
 
  if (not "-f" in opts): 
   raise Exception("Memory Image File not specified, use -h for help!") 
  f = opts["-f"]    
   
  if (not "-p" in opts): 
   raise Exception("PID not specified, use -h for help!") 
  p = int(opts["-p"]) 
 
  if ("-o" in opts): 
   if os.path.exists(opts["-o"]): 
    raise Exception("The output filename already exists!") 
   out = opts["-o"] 
 
 except getopt.GetoptError, error: 
  print " Error: " + str(error) 
  usage(argv[0]) 
  sys.exit(0) 
 
 except Exception, ex: 
  print " Error: " + str(ex) 
  sys.exit(0) 
  
 return (v, f, p, out) 
 
 
def taskByPid(pid, f):              # Returns task_struct address from PID 
  
 init = init_task - kernel_start 
 current_pid = 0 
 
 current_task = init 
 
 f.seek(current_task + task_offset) 
 val, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
 current_task = (val - kernel_start) - task_offset 
 f.seek(current_task + pid_offset) 
 current_pid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4)) 
 
 while (current_task != init and current_pid != pid): 
   
  f.seek(current_task + task_offset) 
  val, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  current_task = (val - kernel_start) - task_offset 
  f.seek(current_task + pid_offset) 
  current_pid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4)) 
   
 if (current_task == init): 
  return None 








        # addr = cred address from 
task_struct 
 addr = addr - kernel_start 
 f.seek(addr + 4) 
 uid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4)) 
 gid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4)) 
 suid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4)) 
 sgid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4)) 
 euid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4)) 
 egid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4)) 
 fsuid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4)) 
 fsgid, = struct.unpack('<i', f.read(4)) 
  
 cred = Structure (uid=uid, gid=gid, suid=suid, sgid=sgid, euid=euid, 
     egid=egid, fsuid=fsuid, fsgid=fsgid) 
 




def getOpenFiles(addr, f):   # Returns list of open files from file table 
 
 l = [] 
 open_files = [] 
 filename = "" 
 
 addr -= kernel_start 
 f.seek(addr + fdt_offset) 
 addr, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))  # Pointer to File table 
 
 addr -= kernel_start 
 f.seek(addr + fd_offset) 
 addr, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4))   # Pointer to array of fds 
 
 addr -= kernel_start  
 f.seek(addr) 
 addr, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
 
 while addr != 0 :    
  l.append(addr) 
  addr, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  
 for addr in l : 
  """ 
  f.seek(addr + dentry_offset) 
  dentry, = struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
  dentry -= kernel_start 
  """ 
  file = File(addr) 
  filename = file.getFilePath(f) 
 
  if filename == "" : 
   continue 
 
  # print filename 
  open_files.append(filename) 
 
 return open_files 
 
 
def getKernelModeStack(addr, f):   # Get Top of stack containing process CPU registers 
 
 addr -= kernel_start - 4     # -4 to include top of stack 
 f.seek (addr - regs_size) 
 buf = f.read(regs_size) 
 # print buf 
 return buf 
 
 
def VirtToPhysical(addr, f, pgd) :  # Translate from user mode Virtual to Physical 
Address. 
       # 
       # Returns the triplet (Paget table flags, 
Type of page entry, Physical address of frame if any). 
       # 
       # The type of page table is:  
       # - 0 for a page directory entry 
       # - 1 for a page table entry 
       # 





 ret = ((pgd >> 12) << 12) + (addr >> 22)*4 
 f.seek(ret - kernel_start) 
 pgd_entry, =  struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
 
 if (pgd_entry & 0b1 != 0b1): 
  #print "PGD_ENTRY present flag is 0: Page frame not in memory ", 
  #print hex(pgd_entry) 
  return (pgd_entry & 0xfff, 0, 0) 
  
 ret = ((pgd_entry >> 12) << 12) + ((addr >> 12) & (1 << 10)-1)*4 
 f.seek(ret) 
 pt_entry, =  struct.unpack('<L', f.read(4)) 
 
 if (pt_entry & 0b1 != 0b1):   # Not in Memory 
  #print "PT_ENTRY present flag is 0: Page frame not in memory " 
  #print hex(pt_entry) 
  return (pt_entry & 0xfff, 1, 0) 
  
 
 final = (((pt_entry >> 12) << 12) + (addr & (1 << 12) - 1)) 
 




def dumpVmArea(vmarea, f, pgd):    # Dump the contents of a memory region, 
NOT USED NOW!!! 
 
 addr = vmarea.vm_start 
 dump = "" 
 i = 0 
 while addr < vmarea.vm_end : 
 
  (flags, page_type, res) = VirtToPhysical(addr, f, pgd) 
  if (not res): 
   #print "Page could not be found: start = 0x%08x , end = 0x%08x" % 
(vmarea.vm_start, addr) 
   #print "" 
   addr += page_size 
   continue 
 
  else : 
   if (res & page_mask) : 
    print " Oops! Page address 0x%08x not aligned" % addr 
    print "" 
    
   f.seek(res) 
   dump += f.read(page_size) 
   
  addr += page_size 
  i += 1 
 
 #print i 
 return (dump, i)   
   
 
 
def buildXml(task, output, f):     #  Build XML file from Process Structure 
 
 
 out = open (output, "w") 
 dirs = 'tsk_files/' 
 regstring = 'region' 
 
 if dump_map: 
 
  if not os.path.isdir("./" + dirs): 
   os.makedirs(dirs) 
  if not os.path.isdir("./" + dirs): 
   print "Cannot create \"tsk_files\" directory!! All memory segment related 
files will be in current directory!" 
   #dirs = './' 
 
 doc = Document() 
 
 proc = doc.createElement("process") 
 proc.setAttribute("magic_number", MAGIC) 
 proc.setAttribute("kernel_version", "2.6.35") 






 old_pid = doc.createElement("old_pid") 
 proc.appendChild(old_pid) 
 pid_t = doc.createTextNode(str(task.pid)) 
 old_pid.appendChild(pid_t) 
 
 name = doc.createElement("name") 
 proc.appendChild(name) 
 comm = doc.createTextNode(task.name) 
 name.appendChild(comm) 
 
 state = doc.createElement("state") 
 proc.appendChild(state) 
 state_t = doc.createTextNode(str(task.state)) 
 state.appendChild(state_t) 
  
 flags = doc.createElement("flags") 
 flags.setAttribute("value", "0x%08x" % (task.flags)) 
 proc.appendChild(flags) 
 
 cred = doc.createElement("credentials") 
 proc.appendChild(cred) 
 for (attr, value) in task.cred.__dict__.items(): 
  cred.setAttribute(attr, "%d" % value) 
  
 
 buf = getKernelModeStack(task.kmstack, f) 
  
 #print "%s" %buf 
 
 buf = base64.standard_b64encode(buf) 
 reg_set = doc.createElement("reg_set") 
 proc.appendChild(reg_set) 
 reg_set.setAttribute("encoding", "binary-base64") 




 vmstruct = doc.createElement("vmstruct") 
 proc.appendChild(vmstruct) 
 for (attr, value) in task.vmstruct.__dict__.items(): 
  vmstruct.setAttribute(attr, "0x%08x" % value) 
 
  
 ############################# seglist   #########################  
 segments = doc.createElement("segments") 
 segments.setAttribute("number", "%d" % (len(task.seglist))) 
 sp = task.sp_addr - kernel_start 
 
 count = 0 
 
 for vmarea in task.seglist : 
 
  pgoff = 0  # Offset of page in file representing a region. 
  #name = 'vm%d'%count 
 
  if dump_map: 
   regfilename = '%s%s%d'%(dirs, regstring, count) 
   reg_file = open (regfilename, "w") 
   #print "%s" %name 
 
  region = doc.createElement("vm_region") 
  region.setAttribute("vm_start", "0x%08x" % vmarea.vm_start) 
  region.setAttribute("vm_end", "0x%08x" % vmarea.vm_end) 
  region.setAttribute("vm_pgprot", "0x%08x" % vmarea.vm_pgprot) 
  region.setAttribute("vm_flags", "0x%08x" % vmarea.vm_flags) 
  region.setAttribute("vm_pgoff", "0x%08x" % vmarea.vm_pgoff) 
  if dump_map:  
   region.setAttribute("local_file", "%s" %regfilename) 
  
  #(dmp, num) = dumpVmArea(vmarea, f, task.pgd)  
 
 
  addr = vmarea.vm_start 
  num = 0 
 
  if vmarea.vm_file != 0 : 
   file = File(vmarea.vm_file) 
   filename = file.getFilePath(f) 
   region.setAttribute("filename", filename) 
 






   (flgs, ptype, res) = VirtToPhysical(addr, f, pgd) 
 
   if (not res): 
    #print "Page not present in memory: start = 0x%08x , end = 0x%08x" % 
(addr, addr+page_size) 
    present = 0 
    addr += page_size 
    continue 
 
   #fname = name + '_frame%d'%num 
 
   frame = doc.createElement("vm_frame") 
 
   frame.setAttribute("vm_start", "0x%08x" % addr) 
   frame.setAttribute("vm_end", "0x%08x" % (addr + page_size)) 
   frame.setAttribute("flags", "0x%08x" % flgs) 
   frame.setAttribute("offset", "0x%08x" % pgoff) 
 
   #if (ptype): 
   # frame.setAttribute("entry_type", "pte") 
   #else: 
   # frame.setAttribute("entry_type", "pgd") 
 
   present = 1 
   if (res & page_mask) : 
    print " Oops! Page address 0x%08x not aligned!" % addr 
    
   f.seek(res) 
   dmp = f.read(page_size) 
   if dump_map: 
    reg_file.seek(pgoff) 
    reg_file.write(dmp) 
 
   if vmarea.vm_file == 0 : 
    dmp = base64.standard_b64encode(dmp) 
    frame.setAttribute("encoding", "binary-base64")    
    mem_contents = doc.createTextNode(dmp) 
    frame.appendChild(mem_contents) 
 
   region.appendChild(frame) 
   addr += page_size 
   pgoff += page_size 
   num += 1 
 
  region.setAttribute("num_pages", "%d" % num) 
  segments.appendChild(region) 
  count += 1 
   
 




 ############################### end seglist  ######################## 
 
 open_files = doc.createElement("open_files") 
 open_files.setAttribute("Number", "%d" % (len(task.open_files))) 
 proc.appendChild(open_files) 
 
 for p in task.open_files: 
  var = doc.createElement("file") 
  var.setAttribute("pathname", p) 
  open_files.appendChild(var) 
 
 signals = doc.createElement("signals") 
 proc.appendChild(signals) 
   
 sig_act = doc.createElement("sig_actions") 
 sig_act.setAttribute("encoding", "binary-base64") 
 signals.appendChild(sig_act) 
 
 sig_hand_addr = task.sig_actions - kernel_start 
 f.seek(sig_hand_addr) 
 buf = f.read(sig_action_size) 
 buf = base64.standard_b64encode(buf) 
 






 blocked = doc.createElement("sig_blocked") 
 signals.appendChild(blocked) 
 blocked.setAttribute("value", "0x%016x" % (task.sig_blocked)) 
 
 pending = doc.createElement("sig_pending") 
 signals.appendChild(pending) 
 pending.setAttribute("value", "0x%016x" % (task.sig_pending)) 
  









  ###################################################### 
  #  ***** MAIN ********         # 
  ###################################################### 
 
print "" 
print " Gettsk version 0.1 " 
print " By Ernest Mougoue <mougoued@dukes.jmu.edu>" 
print "" 
 
(verbose, fileString, pid, outString) = check_options(sys.argv) 
 
 
# print "Test: pid = %d, file = %s, out = %s, verb = %d " % (pid, fileString, outString, verbose) 
 
dump_map = 0   # dump memory mappings to external files? 
 
dumpfile = open(fileString, "rb") 
 
if (pid == 0): 
 print "Cannot extract \"swapper\", Please choose another process!" 
 print "" 
 sys.exit(0) 
 
task_addr = taskByPid(pid, dumpfile)    # Get the address of task_struct 
 
if (task_addr == None): 
 print "There is no process with PID: %d, Please choose another process!" % pid 
 print "" 
 sys.exit(0) 
 
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + comm_offset)    # Get Process' Name 
i = 16 
comm = "" 
read = dumpfile.read(1) 
while (i > 0) and (read != "\x00"): 
 comm += read 
 read = dumpfile.read(1) 
 i -= 1 
 
if (verbose):  
 print "" 
 print "  The chosen Process is:" 
 print "  PID: %d" % pid 
 print "  Name: %s @ 0x%08x" % (comm, task_addr) 
 print "  Output File : %s" % outString 
 print "" 
 
if (verbose): 
 print "  + Getting Process' State....." 
 
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + state_offset) 
state, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4))  # Get Process' Running State 





 print "  + Getting Process' Flags....." 
 
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + flags_offset) 
flags, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4))  # Get Process' flags 








 print "  + Getting Process' Memory Mappings....." 
 
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + mm_offset) 
 
mm_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4)) # Get Process' mm_struct Base Address 
if mm_addr < kernel_start : 
 print "This Process has an invalid memory map!!!" 
 print "Exiting ......" 
 print "" 
 sys.exit(0) 
  
mm_struct = AddresSpace(mm_addr) 
vmstruct = mm_struct.getVmStruct(dumpfile)  # Get Memory Map Structure of process 









 print "  + Getting Process' Credentials....." 
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + cred_offset) 
cred_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4)) # Get Process' Credentials Base Address 
cred = getCred(cred_addr, dumpfile) 




 print "  + Getting Process' Kernel Mode Stack....." 
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + sp0_offset) 




 print " + Kernel Mode Stack Pointer:    0x%08x" %kmstack_addr 
 
sp_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4)) # Get Process' Stack Pointer 
 
if (verbose):  
 print " + Stack Pointer:    0x%08x" %sp_addr 
 
ip_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4)) 
ip_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4)) 
 
dumpfile.seek(ip_addr - kernel_start) 






# dumpfile.seek(task_addr + fs_offset) 





 print "  + Getting Process' Open Files....." 
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + files_offset) 
files_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4)) # Get Process' files_struct Base Address 
open_files = getOpenFiles(files_addr, dumpfile) # Get a list of opened files 





 print "  + Getting Process' Signals....." 
 
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + sighand_offset)    
sighand_addr, = struct.unpack('<L', dumpfile.read(4)) # Get Process' Signal Handlers address 
sighand_addr += 4    # Address of Signal Actions 
# sighand = getSigHand(sighand_addr, dumpfile) 
 
 
dumpfile.seek(task_addr + sigblocked_offset) 
blocked, = struct.unpack('<d', dumpfile.read(8)) # Blocked signals 





dumpfile.seek(task_addr + sigpending_offset + 8) 




# -----All the infos about a Process in a structure-------------------- 
 
process = Structure(task_addr = task_addr, pid = pid, name = comm, state = state,  
flags = flags,seglist = seglist, cred = cred, vmstruct = vmstruct, kmstack = 
kmstack_addr,   
                     open_files = open_files, sp_addr = sp_addr, pgd = pgd, 
       sig_actions = sighand_addr, sig_blocked = blocked,  





 print "  + Building XML File....." 
done = buildXml(process, outString, dumpfile)   # Build XML File 
 
if (done): 






print "Done. " 
print " "
 
APPENDIX D: XML SCHEMA FOR GETTSK’S OUTPUT 
 
  
<? xml version = “1.0”?> 
<xs: element name=”process”> 
     <xs:complexType> 
          <xs:sequence> 
 <xs:element name=”pid” type=”xs:integer”/> 
 <xs: element name=”name” type=”xs:string”/> 
 <xs:element name=”state” type=”xs:integer”/> 
 <xs:element name=”flags” type=”xs:integer”/> 
 </xs:element> 
 <xs:element name=”credentials”> 
      <xs:attribute name=”uid” type=”xs:integer”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”gid” type=”xs:integer”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”euid” type=”xs:integer”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”egid” type=”xs:integer”/> 
                     <xs:attribute name=”fsuid” type=”xs:integer”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”fsgid” type=”xs:integer”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”suid” type=”xs:integer”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”sgid” type=”xs:integer”/> 
 </xs:element> 
 <xs:element name=”reg_set” type=”xs:string”> 
      <xs:attribute name=”encoding” type=”xs:string” default=”binary-base64”/> 
 </xs:element> 
 <xs:element name=”vmstruct”> 
      <xs:attribute name=”start_code” type=”xs:string”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”end_code” type=”xs:string”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”start_data” type=”xs:string”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”end_data” type=”xs:string”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”start_brk” type=”xs:string”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”brk” type=”xs:string”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”arg_start” type=”xs:string”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”arg_end” type=”xs:string”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”start_stack” type=”xs:string”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”env_start” type=”xs:string”/> 
      <xs:attribute name=”env_end” type=”xs:string”/> 
 </xs:element> 
<xs:element name=”segments”> 
     <xs:complexType> 
          <xs:sequence> 
  <xs:element name=”vm_region” type”xs:string” minOccurs=”0” 
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/> 
                                      <xs:attribute name=”encoding” type=”xs:string” default=”binary-base64”/> 
        <xs:attribute name=”vm_start” type=”xs:string”/> 
        <xs:attribute name=”vm_end” type=”xs:string”/> 
        <xs:attribute name=”vm_pgprot” type=”xs:string”/> 
        <xs:attribute name=”vm_pgoff” type=”xs:string”/> 
        <xs:attribute name=”vm_flags” type=”xs:string”/> 




        <xs:attribute name=”filename” type=”xs:string” use=”optional”/> 
  </xs:element> 
           </xs:sequence> 
           <xs:attribute name=”number” type=”xs:integer”> 
      </xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
 <xs:element name=”open_files”> 
      <xs:complexType> 
           <xs:element name=”file” minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”> 
  <xs:attribute name=”pathname” type=”xs:string”/>  
           </xs:element> 
          <xs:attribute name=”Number” type=”xs:integer”> 
      </xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name=”signals”> 
     <xs:complexType> 
           <xs:sequence> 
 <xs:element name=”sig_actions” type=”xs:strings”> 
       <xs:attribute name=”encoding” type=”xs:string” default=”binary-base64”/> 
 </xs:element> 
 <xs:element name=”sig_blocked” type=”xs:strings”> 
       <xs:attribute name=”value” type=”xs:string”/> 
 </xs:element> 
 <xs:element name=”sig_pending” type=”xs:strings”> 
       <xs:attribute name=”value” type=”xs:string”/> 
 </xs:element> 
             </xs:sequence> 
        </xs:complexType> 
</xs:elements> 
<xs:attribute name=”arch” type=”xs:string” default=”x86”/> 
<xs:attribute name=”kernel” type=”xs:string” default=”2.6.35.8”/> 
<xs:attribute name=”magic_number” type=”xs:string” default=”FFC0”> 
            </xs:sequence> 





APPENDIX E: MEMEXEC SOURCE CODE 
 
 This is the source code of the 3 files constituting the memexec tool: memexec.c, 
memexec.h and memlkm.c. Also included is the Makefile used to compile them. 
******************** memexec.h ****************************** 
#include <asm/ptrace.h> 
#include <linux/ipc.h>  
#include <asm/param.h> 
 
#define MEMPROC_SIZE sizeof(struct memproc) 
#define MAX_FILENAME   256 
#define MAX_PATH   256 
#define PAGES    4096 // Page Size 
 
/* IOCTL */ 
 
#define MAGIC_NUMBER 0xCC 
#define IOCTL_RESTART                   _IOW(MAGIC_NUMBER, 1, struct memproc *) 
#define MAX_IOC_NR 1 
#define DEV_FILE    "/dev/memexec" 
 
struct credentials { 
 int uid, gid, suid, sgid, euid, egid, fsuid, fsgid; 
}; 
 
struct registers { 
 int size; 
 char *regs; 
}; 
 
struct signals { 
 int sig_actions_size; 
 char *sig_actions; 
 unsigned long sig_blocked, sig_pending; 
}; 
 
struct vmstruct { 
 unsigned long start_code, end_code, start_data, end_data; 
 unsigned long start_brk, brk, start_stack, arg_start, arg_end; 
 unsigned long env_start, env_end; 
}; 
 
struct frames { 
 unsigned long present; 
 unsigned long flags; 
 unsigned long offset;  
 char entry_type[3]; 
  
 unsigned long vm_start, vm_end; 




struct segments { 
 unsigned long vm_start, vm_end, prot, flags, pgoff; 
 int num_pages; 
 int vm_file; 
 char local_file[MAX_PATH];  // Local file storing the contents of the segment. 
 char filename[MAX_FILENAME]; 
 //char *contents; 






struct open_file { 
 /* Not Fully supported - Now only shows open file's path */ 




struct memproc { 
 unsigned long old_pid, state, flags; 
 int seg_num;   /* Number of Segments */ 
 int file_num;       /* Number of Open Files */ 
  
 char name[16]; 
 struct registers reg_set; 
 struct credentials memcred; 
 struct vmstruct vm_map; 
 struct segments *seglist; 
 struct open_file *filelist; 
 struct signals sig; 
}; 
 
static inline void mem_strncpy(char * src, const char * dest, int size) { 
  int i; 
  for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 
    src[i] = dest[i]; 
  } 
} 








/* Standard in kernel modules */ 
#include <linux/smp.h> 
#include <linux/kernel.h>   /* We're doing kernel work */ 
#include <linux/module.h>   /* Specifically, a module */ 
 
/* For character devices */ 
#include <linux/fs.h>       /* The character device  





















/* verbose printks */ 





static inline unsigned long get_mmap_flags(unsigned short vm_flags) { 
 
  return MAP_FIXED | 
    (vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE? MAP_SHARED : MAP_PRIVATE) | 
    (vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) | 










    Restart a process. 
*/ 
 
static int restart(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long arg, 
                   unsigned long stack_size) 
{ 
 
 struct memproc *mem; 
 struct pt_regs *regs; 
 struct pt_regs *tmp; 
 struct pt_regs *tmp1; 
 int ret; 
 int err, i, k; 
 mm_segment_t fs; 
 sigset_t * blocked; 





 mem = (struct memproc*)kmalloc(sizeof(struct memproc), GFP_KERNEL); 
 
   // arg is the pointer to param 
   if (copy_from_user(mem, (struct memproc *)arg, sizeof(struct memproc))) 
      return -EFAULT; 
 
 fs = get_fs(); 
 err = -ENOMEM;  
 
 // Restore command name 
 mem_strncpy(current->comm, mem->name, 16); 
 printk(KERN_INFO "MEMEXEC: %s \n", current->comm); 
 
 if (verbose) 
   printk(KERN_INFO "MEMEXEC: Restoring Flags\n"); 
 
 current->flags = mem->flags; 
 
 current->state = TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE; 
  
 
 if (verbose) 
   printk(KERN_INFO "MEMEXEC: Restoring vm areas\n"); 
 
 /* Map all the segments */ 
 
 for (i=0; i<mem->seg_num; i++) 
 
 { 
     unsigned long size; 
      unsigned long mmap_prot, mmap_flags; 
  struct file *file; 
  int omode = O_RDONLY; 
 
  set_fs(KERNEL_DS); 
 
    size = mem->seglist[i].vm_end - mem->seglist[i].vm_start; 
 
    mmap_prot = mem->seglist[i].flags & 7; 
    mmap_flags = get_mmap_flags(mem->seglist[i].flags); 
 
  set_fs(fs); 
        if ( (mmap_prot&PROT_WRITE) && (mmap_flags&MAP_SHARED) && 
      !(mmap_flags&MAP_DENYWRITE))  
   omode = O_RDWR; 
 
 
  if (mem->seglist[i].num_pages == 0) 
   continue; 
 
 
  if (mem->seglist[i].vm_file == 0) 
  { 
    





   if ((mmap_flags&MAP_GROWSDOWN) || !(mmap_flags&MAP_EXECUTABLE)) 
       ret = do_mmap(NULL, mem->seglist[i].vm_start, size, mmap_prot|PROT_WRITE, 
        mmap_flags, 0);  
 
   up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem); 
 
         if (ret != mem->seglist[i].vm_start) 
    printk(KERN_INFO "Error in mmap %08lx!! Received %d !\n",  
mem->seglist[i].vm_start, ret); 
 
  for (k=0; k<=mem->seglist[i].num_pages - 1; k++) 
  { 
   set_fs(KERNEL_DS); 
 
   if (mem->seglist[i].num_pages == 0) 
     break; 
 
   if ((ret = copy_to_user((void *)mem->seglist[i].framelist[k].vm_start,  
      mem>seglist[i].framelist[k].contents, 
PAGE_SIZE)) > 0)   
   printk(KERN_INFO "Fail Copy??...  0x%08lx, %d \n",  
mem->seglist[i].framelist[k].vm_start, ret); 
    
  } 
 
  } 
         
  else  
  { 
 
   set_fs(KERNEL_DS); 
   file = filp_open(mem->seglist[i].filename, omode, 0); 
     
   size = mem->seglist[i].vm_end - mem->seglist[i].vm_start; 
 
   down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem); 
 
       ret = do_mmap_pgoff(file, mem->seglist[i].vm_start, size, mmap_prot, 
        mmap_flags, mem->seglist[i].pgoff); 
 
   up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem); 
 
   fput(file); 
 
         if (ret != mem->seglist[i].vm_start) 
    printk("Error in mmap %08lx!! Received %08x !\n",  
mem->seglist[i].vm_start, ret); 
 




   set_fs(fs); 
 
  /* Restore the memory mapping */ 
 if (verbose) 





        current->mm->start_code  = mem->vm_map.start_code; 
        current->mm->end_code    = mem->vm_map.end_code; 
        current->mm->start_data  = mem->vm_map.start_data; 
        current->mm->end_data    = mem->vm_map.end_data; 
        current->mm->start_brk   = mem->vm_map.start_brk; 
        current->mm->brk         = mem->vm_map.brk; 
        current->mm->start_stack = mem->vm_map.start_stack; 
        current->mm->arg_start   = mem->vm_map.arg_start; 
        current->mm->arg_end     = mem->vm_map.arg_end; 
        current->mm->env_start   = mem->vm_map.env_start; 





 if (verbose) 
   printk(KERN_INFO "MEMEXEC: Restoring registers\n"); 
 





 tmp = (struct pt_regs *)mem->reg_set.regs; 
 tmp1 = (struct pt_regs *)kmalloc(sizeof(struct pt_regs), GFP_KERNEL); 
 




 /*   FILES   */ 
 //if (verbose) 




 /*    SIGNALS     */ 
 /******************/ 
 
 if (verbose) 
   printk(KERN_INFO "MEMEXEC: Restoring signal handlers\n"); 
  
 sig = (struct sighand_struct *) mem->sig.sig_actions; 
 atomic_set(&sig->count, 1); 
  
     spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);   
 
 
 for (i = 0; i < _NSIG; i++) 
 { 
  current->sighand->action[i] = sig->action[i]; 
  if (i== SIGSTOP-1 || i == SIGKILL -1)   
  { 
   current->sighand->action[i].sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL; 
   current->sighand->action[i].sa.sa_flags = 0; 
   sigemptyset(&current->sighand->action[i].sa.sa_mask); 
  } 
   




     spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock); 
 
 blocked = (sigset_t *)&mem->sig.sig_blocked; 
 for (i = 0; i < _NSIG_WORDS; i++) 
  current->blocked.sig[i] = blocked->sig[i]; 
 
 // Restore Process' State 
 current->state = TASK_RUNNING; //mem->state; 
 
 if (verbose) 
   printk(KERN_INFO "MEMEXEC: *** RESTART: done ***\n"); 
 
 err = 0; 
 







/* Device Declarations **************************** */ 
 
/* The name for our device, as it will appear  
 * in /proc/devices */ 
#define DEVICE_NAME "memexec" 
 
int memexec_open(struct inode *inode,  
       struct file *file) { 
  return 0; 
} 
 
int memexec_release(struct inode *inode,  
   struct file *file) { 




 * ioctl impl. for checkpoint. Primary means to interact with device. 
 */ 




        unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { 
 
 
  /* Quick error checking. */ 
  if(_IOC_TYPE(cmd) != MAGIC_NUMBER) return -ENOTTY; 
  if(_IOC_NR(cmd) > MAX_IOC_NR) return -ENOTTY; 
 
  // do restart here 
  if (cmd == IOCTL_RESTART)  
    return restart(SIGCHLD, arg, 0); 
 
    return -EINVAL;     
} 
 
/* Module Declarations ***************************** */ 
 
static int major; 
 
struct file_operations memexec_fops = { 
 owner:  THIS_MODULE, 
 ioctl:  memexec_ioctl, 
 open:  memexec_open, 
 release: memexec_release, 
}; 
 
int memexec_init(void)  
{ 
  int result; 
 
  result = register_chrdev(0, DEVICE_NAME, &memexec_fops); 
   
  if(result < 0){ 
    printk(KERN_ALERT "Registering Device Failed w/ major %d.\n", major); 
    return result; 
  } 
 
  if(verbose) 
   printk(KERN_INFO "*****Device Memexec Loaded!!!*****");  
 
  major = result; 
 
  return 0; 
} 
 
void memexec_cleanup(void)  
{ 








































** Translation Table as described in RFC1113 
*/ 
static const char cb64[]="ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; 
 
/* 
** Translation Table to decode (created by author) 
*/ 






** decode 4 '6-bit' characters into 3 8-bit binary bytes 
*/ 
void decodeblock( unsigned char in[4], unsigned char out[3] ) 
{    
    out[ 0 ] = (unsigned char ) (in[0] << 2 | in[1] >> 4); 
    out[ 1 ] = (unsigned char ) (in[1] << 4 | in[2] >> 2); 






** decode a base64 encoded stream discarding padding, line breaks and noise 
*/ 
static int b64decode(char *src, char *dst ) 
{ 
 unsigned char in[4], out[3], v; 
 int i, len, size; 
 char *tmpptr; 
 FILE *pFile; 
  
 pFile = fopen(".out", "wb+"); 
 tmpptr = src; 
 
     while( *tmpptr )  
     { 
         for( len = 0, i = 0; i < 4 && *tmpptr; i++ )  
  { 
              v = 0; 
              while( *tmpptr && v == 0 )  
   { 
                  v = (unsigned char) (*tmpptr); 
                  v = (unsigned char) ((v < 43 || v > 122) ? 0 : cd64[ v - 43 ]); 
                  if( v )  
    { 
                       v = (unsigned char) ((v == '$') ? 0 : v - 61); 
                  } 
     
    tmpptr++; 
              } 
             if( *tmpptr )  
  { 
                 len++; 
                 if( v )  
   { 
                      in[ i ] = (unsigned char) (v - 1); 
                 } 
             } 
             else  
  { 
                 in[i] = 0; 
             } 
        } 
        if( len ) 
 { 
         decodeblock( in, out ); 
         for( i = 0; i < len - 1; i++ ) 
                 putc( out[i], pFile ); 
        } 






 fseek(pFile, 0, SEEK_END); 
 size = ftell(pFile); 
 fseek(pFile, 0, SEEK_SET); 
  
 
 fread(dst, size, 1, pFile); 
 fclose(pFile); 
 return size; 
} 
 
void dump_buffer(void *buffer, int buffer_size) 
{ 
  int i; 
 
  for(i = 0;i < buffer_size;++i) 
     printf("%c", ((char *)buffer)[i]); 
} 
 
static void mem_copy(char * dst, char * src, size_t size) 
{ 
 char *tmp; 
 int i = 0; 
 
 for (tmp = src;i<size;++tmp) 
 { 
  dst[i] = *tmp; 
  i++; 
 } 




static int stripSpaces(char* in)    // Remove White spaces 
{ 
  
 char *ret; 
 char *tmp; 
 int i = 0; 
 int j = 0; 
 
 ret = malloc(strlen(in)+1); 
 for (tmp = in;*tmp!='\0';++tmp) 
 { 
  if (!isspace(*tmp)) 
  { 
   ret[j] = *tmp; 
   j++; 
  } 
 } 
 ret[j] = '\0'; 
 
 mem_copy(in, ret, j); 
 free(ret); 
 




static void parseDoc(char *docname, struct memproc * input) //Parse XML document 
{ 
 
 xmlDocPtr doc; 
 xmlNodePtr cur, child; 
 xmlChar *key; 
 char *test, *str; 
 int size, err; 
 
 doc = xmlParseFile(docname); 
  
 if (doc == NULL ) { 
  fprintf(stderr,"Document not parsed successfully. \n"); 
  return; 
 } 
 cur = xmlDocGetRootElement(doc); 
  
 if (cur == NULL) { 
  fprintf(stderr,"empty document\n"); 
  xmlFreeDoc(doc); 






 if (xmlStrcmp(cur->name, (const xmlChar *) "process")) { 
  fprintf(stderr,"document of the wrong type, root node != process"); 
  xmlFreeDoc(doc); 
  return; 
 } 
  
 cur = cur->xmlChildrenNode; 
 
 
 /************* GET OLD PID *************/ 
 
 child = cur; 
 while (child != NULL) { 
 
  if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"old_pid"))) 
  { 
   key = xmlNodeGetContent(child->xmlChildrenNode); 
   input->old_pid = atoi(key); 
   //printf("OLD_PID: %ld  \n", input->old_pid); 
   xmlFree(key); 
   break; 
  } 
     
 child = child->next; 
 }  
  
 
 /*********** GET NAME ***************/ 
 
 
 child = cur; 
 while (child != NULL) { 
 
  if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"name"))) 
  { 
   key = xmlNodeListGetString(doc, child->xmlChildrenNode, 1); 
   test = (char *)key; 
   err = stripSpaces(test); 
   strcpy(input->name, test); 
   //printf("NAME: %s\n", input->name); 
   xmlFree(key); 
   break; 
  }   
 child = child->next; 
 }  
 
 /*********** GET STATE ***************/ 
 
 child = cur; 
 while (child != NULL) { 
 
  if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"state"))) 
  { 
   key = xmlNodeGetContent(child->xmlChildrenNode); 
   input->state = atoi(key); 
   //printf("STATE: %ld  \n", input->state); 
   xmlFree(key); 
   break; 
  } 
     
 child = child->next; 
 }  
 
 /*********** GET FLAGS ***************/ 
 
 child = cur; 
 while (child != NULL) { 
 
  if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"flags"))) 
  { 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "value"); 
   input->flags = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);  // String to unsigned long 
   //printf("FLAGS: 0x%08x  \n", (int) input->flags); 
   xmlFree(key); 
   break; 
  } 
     
 child = child->next; 






 /*********** GET CREDENTIALS ***************/ 
 
 child = cur; 
 while (child != NULL) { 
 
  if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"credentials"))) 
  { 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "uid"); 
   input->memcred.uid = atoi(key);  
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "gid"); 
   input->memcred.gid = atoi(key); 
 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "euid"); 
   input->memcred.euid = atoi(key); 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "egid"); 
   input->memcred.egid = atoi(key); 
 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "suid"); 
   input->memcred.suid = atoi(key); 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "sgid"); 
   input->memcred.sgid = atoi(key); 
 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "fsuid"); 
   input->memcred.fsuid = atoi(key); 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "fsgid"); 
   input->memcred.fsgid = atoi(key); 
 
   //printf("CREDENTIALS - UID: %d  \n", input->memcred.uid); 
   xmlFree(key); 
   break; 
  } 
     
 child = child->next; 
 }  
 
 /*********** GET REGISTERS ***************/ 
 
 child = cur; 
 while (child != NULL) { 
 
  if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"reg_set"))) 
  { 
   key = xmlNodeListGetString(doc, child->xmlChildrenNode, 1); 
   test = (char *)key; 
   err = stripSpaces(test); 
 
   str = (char *)malloc(strlen(test) + 1); 
   input->reg_set.regs = (char *)malloc(strlen(test) + 1); 
   str[0] = '\0'; 
   size = b64decode(test, str); 
   mem_copy(input->reg_set.regs, str, size); 
   input->reg_set.size = size; 
   xmlFree(key); 
   free(str); 
   break; 
  }   
 child = child->next; 
 }  
 
 
 /*********** GET VMSTRUCT ***************/ 
 
 child = cur; 
 while (child != NULL) { 
 
  if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"vmstruct"))) 
  { 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "start_code"); 
   input->vm_map.start_code = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16);  
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "end_code"); 
   input->vm_map.end_code = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "start_data"); 
   input->vm_map.start_data = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "end_data"); 
   input->vm_map.end_data = atoi(key); 
 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "start_brk"); 
   input->vm_map.start_brk = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "brk"); 





   key = xmlGetProp(child, "arg_start"); 
   input->vm_map.arg_start = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "arg_end"); 
   input->vm_map.arg_end = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "env_start"); 
   input->vm_map.env_start = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "env_end"); 
   input->vm_map.env_end = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "start_stack"); 
   input->vm_map.start_stack = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
 
   xmlFree(key); 
   break; 
  } 
     
 child = child->next; 
 }  
 
 /*********** GET SEGMENTS ***************/ 
 
 child = cur; 
 while (child != NULL) { 
 
  if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"segments"))) 
  { 
   xmlNodePtr ptr1, ptr2; 
   int k1 = 0; 
 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "number"); 
   input->seg_num = atoi(key); 
 
 
   input->seglist = (struct segments *)malloc(sizeof(struct segments[input-
>seg_num])); 
    
   ptr1 = child->xmlChildrenNode; 
   while (ptr1 != NULL)       // Parse 
each region of a segment 
   { 
        if ((!xmlStrcmp(ptr1->name, (const xmlChar *)"vm_region")))  
    { 
          
         key = xmlGetProp(ptr1, "vm_start"); 
          input->seglist[k1].vm_start = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
         key = xmlGetProp(ptr1, "vm_end"); 
     input->seglist[k1].vm_end = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
         key = xmlGetProp(ptr1, "vm_pgprot"); 
     input->seglist[k1].prot = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
         key = xmlGetProp(ptr1, "vm_flags"); 
     input->seglist[k1].flags = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
         key = xmlGetProp(ptr1, "vm_pgoff"); 
     input->seglist[k1].pgoff = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
         key = xmlGetProp(ptr1, "num_pages"); 
     input->seglist[k1].num_pages = atoi(key); 
 
 
     input->seglist[k1].framelist = (struct frames 
*)malloc(sizeof(struct frames[input->seglist[k1].num_pages])); 
 
     if (key = xmlGetProp(ptr1, "filename")) 
     { 
      strcpy(input->seglist[k1].filename, (char *)key); 
      input->seglist[k1].vm_file = 1; 
     } 
     else 
     { 
      input->seglist[k1].vm_file = 0; 
      strcpy(input->seglist[k1].filename, ""); 
     } 
 
     ptr2 = ptr1->xmlChildrenNode; 
     int k2 = 0; 
 
     while (ptr2 != NULL)     
 // Parse each frame of a region 





          if ((!xmlStrcmp(ptr2->name, (const xmlChar 
*)"vm_frame")))  
      { 
      
           key = xmlGetProp(ptr2, "vm_start"); 
       input->seglist[k1].framelist[k2].vm_start 
= strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
           key = xmlGetProp(ptr2, "vm_end"); 
       input->seglist[k1].framelist[k2].vm_end = 
strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
           key = xmlGetProp(ptr2, "flags"); 
       input->seglist[k1].framelist[k2].flags = 
strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
 
           key = xmlGetProp(ptr2, "offset"); 
       input->seglist[k1].framelist[k2].offset = 
strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
 
       if ( (input->seglist[k1].vm_file == 0) &&  
        (key = xmlNodeListGetString(doc, 
ptr2->xmlChildrenNode, 1)) ) 
       {    
 
         test = (char *)key; 
         err = stripSpaces(test); 
 
         str = (char 
*)malloc(strlen(test) + 1); 
         str[0] = '\0'; 
         input-
>seglist[k1].framelist[k2].contents = (char *)malloc(strlen(test) + 1); 
 
         size = b64decode(test, 
str); 
         mem_copy(input-
>seglist[k1].framelist[k2].contents, str, size); 
 
       } 
       else 
       { 
        input-
>seglist[k1].framelist[k2].contents = (char *)malloc(2); 
        mem_copy(input-
>seglist[k1].framelist[k2].contents, "\0", 2); 
       } 
 
       k2++; 
      } 
 
      ptr2 = ptr2->next; 
     } 
     k1++; 
         } 
    ptr1 = ptr1->next; 
   } 
 
   xmlFree(key);    
  }   






 /*********** GET OPEN FILES ***************/ 
 
 child = cur; 
 while (child != NULL) { 
 
  if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"open_files"))) 
  { 
 
   xmlNodePtr ptr; 
   int k = 0; 
 
   key = xmlGetProp(child, "Number"); 
   input->file_num = atoi(key); 
 
   if (input->file_num == 0) 





   struct open_file tmp[input->file_num]; 
 
   ptr = child->xmlChildrenNode; 
   while (ptr != NULL)  
   { 
        if ((!xmlStrcmp(ptr->name, (const xmlChar *)"vm_region")))  
    { 
         key = xmlGetProp(ptr, "path"); 
     tmp[k].path = malloc(strlen(key) + 1); 
     strcpy(tmp[k].path, (char *) key); 
     k++; 
    } 
    ptr = ptr->next; 
   } 
 
   xmlFree(key); 
   input->filelist = malloc(sizeof(tmp) + 1); 
   input->filelist = tmp; 
   break; 
  }   
 child = child->next; 
 }  
 
 /*********** GET SIGNALS ***************/ 
 
 child = cur; 
 while (child != NULL) { 
 
  if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"signals"))) 
  { 
 
   child = child->xmlChildrenNode; 
   while (child != NULL)  
   { 
        if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"sig_actions")))  
    { 
         key = xmlNodeListGetString(doc, child->xmlChildrenNode, 1); 
     test = (char *)key; 
     err = stripSpaces(test); 
 
     str = (char *)malloc(strlen(test) + 1); 
     str[0] = '\0'; 
     input->sig.sig_actions = (char *)malloc(strlen(test) + 1); 
 
     size = b64decode(test, str); 
     mem_copy(input->sig.sig_actions, str, size); 
     input->sig.sig_actions_size = size; 
    } 
 
        if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"sig_blocked")))  
    { 
         key = xmlGetProp(child, "value"); 
     input->sig.sig_blocked = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
    } 
 
        if ((!xmlStrcmp(child->name, (const xmlChar *)"sig_pending")))  
    { 
         key = xmlGetProp(child, "value"); 
     input->sig.sig_pending = strtoul((char *)key, NULL, 16); 
    } 
 
    child = child->next; 
   } 
 
   xmlFree(key); 
   break; 
  }   
 child = child->next; 





int main(int argc, char **argv) { 
 
 struct memproc *input; 
 char *docname; 
 int ret; 
 int dev_fd = 0; 
 int l, k; 




 if (argc <= 1) { 
  printf("Usage: %s docname\n", argv[0]); 
  return(0); 
 } 
 
 input = (struct memproc *)malloc(sizeof(struct memproc)); 
 docname = argv[1]; 
 parseDoc (docname, input); 
 
 dev_fd = open(DEV_FILE, 0); 
   if (dev_fd<0) 
 { 
      printf("Cannot open device file.... file_desc = %d\n", dev_fd); 
  exit (-1); 
 } 
 
 printf("Device file opened: %d\n", dev_fd); 
 
 ret = ioctl(dev_fd, IOCTL_RESTART, input); 















******************** Makefile ****************************** 
 
 
KDIR := /lib/modules/$(shell uname -r)/build 
PWD  := $(shell pwd) 
 
obj-m += memlkm.o 
 
all:    memlkm  
 gcc memexec.c -o memexec -I/usr/include/libxml2 -lxml2  
 
memlkm: 
 make -Wall -C $(KDIR) SUBDIRS=$(PWD) modules 
 
clean: 
 make -Wall -C  $(KDIR) SUBDIRS=$(PWD) modules clean 
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